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I. INTRODUCTION
Limited Liability Companies (LLCs) are now publicly as well as
privately owned. They may provide critical nursing home care, en-
gage in environmental remediation involving toxic chemicals, or pro-
vide electrical power in Iraq or elsewhere. At what point should
investors be able to remove an errant LLC manager and/or obtain
damages where the manager is neglecting patients or not diligently
handling chemicals? The National Conference of Commissioners on
Uniform State Laws (NCCUSL) has grappled with this question in the
revision of its Uniform Limited Liability Company Act, and the Ameri-
can Bar Association has just begun overhauling its model LLC stat-
ute.' The Revised Uniform Limited Liability Company Act now
1. See REVISED UNIF. LTD. LAB. Co. ACT § 409(c) (2006) providing:
Subject to the business judgment rule, the duty of care of a member of a
member-managed limited liability company in the conduct and winding
up of the company's activities is to act with the care that a person in a
like position would reasonably exercise under similar circumstances and
in a manner the member reasonably believes to be in the best interests
[Vol. 87:125
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defines the duty of care as being, subject to the business judgment
rule, a duty to act with "the care that a person in a like position would
reasonably exercise under similar circumstances and in a manner the
member reasonably believes to be in the best interests of the com-
pany."2 This reflects a change from the original Uniform Limited Lia-
bility Company Act, which imposed a duty to refrain from grossly
negligent or reckless conduct, intentional misconduct, or a knowing
violation of law.3 State LLC statutes are almost evenly divided be-
tween those that state that the duty of care is a duty to exercise stan-
dard care or prudence4 and those that require managers to refrain
from grossly negligent or intentional misconduct. 5 Also, conflicting
positions are being taken with regard to the degree to which the duty
of care may be modified by contract. Delaware permits fiduciary du-
ties in limited partnerships and LLCs to be expanded, restricted or
eliminated by contract, except for the implied contractual covenant of
good faith and fair dealing-the parameters of which are expected to
emerge in Delaware case law.
6
Prior literature has analyzed the merits of contractual freedom in
the LLC, but relatively few recent articles specifically address the
duty of care and the unique attributes of the contemporary LLC man-
ager.7 The cases reviewed in this Article involve LLCs that provide
of the company. In discharging this duty, a member may rely in good
faith upon opinions, reports, statements, or other information provided
by another person that the member reasonably believes is a competent
and reliable source for the information.
See also MODEL LTD. LIAB. Co. ACT §§ 110(c)(5) & 409(a) (First Rough Draft 2007)
(providing that the LLC cannot eliminate liability for a bad faith violation of the
implied contractual covenant of good faith and indicating that duties are to be
performed consistently with the covenant of good faith and fair dealing but ex-
pressly not providing a statutory default duty of care or duty of loyalty to be oper-
ative in the absence of an LLC agreement).
2. REVISED UNIF. LTD. LiAB. Co. ACT § 409(c) (2006).
3. See UNIF. LTD. LIsB. Co. ACT § 409(c) (1996) (providing that "a member's duty of
care to a member-managed company and its other members in the conduct of and
winding up of the company's business is limited to refraining from engaging in
grossly negligent or reckless conduct, intentional misconduct, or a knowing viola-
tion of law").
4. See infra app. B.
5. See infra app. C.
6. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-1101(c) (2005). It would appear that a conscious
disregard for one's duties amounting to recklessness would be the functional
equivalent of bad faith and that an LLC manager could not contractually elimi-
nate liability for the sustained neglect of duties where the director is aware of a
duty to act and fails to act, but this has yet to be judicially developed pursuant to
the Delaware LLC statute. See Myron T. Steele, Judicial Scrutiny of Fiduciary
Duties in Delaware Limited Partnerships and Limited Liability Companies, 32
DEL. J. CORP. L. 1, 14 (2007) (discussing the Delaware legislature's directive to
permit the contractual elimination of fiduciary duties).
7. For recent articles addressing the duty of care, see J. William Callison, "The Law
Does Not Perfectly Comprehend . . . " The Inadequacy of the Gross Negligence
2008]
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extremely important services ranging from psychiatric care to electri-
cal power. The analysis showcases the inappropriateness of the gross
negligence standard of care which has been interpreted as involving a
"devil-may-care attitude or indifference to duty amounting to reckless-
ness"-a standard that seems particularly low for LLCs that provide
important services affecting the public health and welfare. 8 Also, this
Article offers a fresh and contemporary perspective on the duty of care
and takes into account a number of developments that had not yet
occurred when LLC statutes were first enacted. Treasury Regulations
now permit LLCs to restrict the LLC member's withdrawal rights-
increasing the prospects of a "lock-in" effect that may leave LLC inves-
tors at the mercy of entrenched incompetent management-a possibil-
ity all too likely if the investor has executed a simple form LLC
agreement without seriously studying and negotiating contractual
terms, exit rights, or management termination provisions. 9 Also, nu-
merous accounting scandals and duty of loyalty controversies have
Duty of Care Standard in Unincorporated Business Organizations, 94 Ky. L.J.
451, 484-85 (2006) (criticizing the gross negligence formulation and recom-
mending that the duty of care be left to the judiciary rather than to the legisla-
ture); Elizabeth S. Miller & Thomas E. Rutledge, The Duty of Finest Loyalty and
Reasonable Decisions: The Business Judgment Rule in Unincorporated Business
Organizations?, 30 DEL. J. CORP. L. 343, 344 (2005) (analyzing the business judg-
ment rule in the context of unincorporated entities). For early discussions of con-
tractual freedom and fiduciary duties, see Franklin A. Gevurtz, California's New
Limited Liability Company Act: A Look at the Good, the Bad, and the Ambiguous,
27 PAC. L.J. 261, 269-70 (1996) (discussing fiduciary duties and briefly comment-
ing upon the duty of care in California LLCs). See also Symposium, Foreword to
Freedom of Contract and Fiduciary Duty: Organizing the Internal Relations of the
Unincorporated Firm, 54 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 389 (1997) (expressing a spectrum
of views on contractual freedom in unincorporated entities); Sandra K. Miller,
What Standards of Conduct Should Apply to Members and Managers of Limited
Liability Companies?, 68 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 21, 29-30 (1994) (discussing the duty
of care in the LLC prior to the emergence of LLC duty of care cases); see generally
Claire Moore Dickerson, Equilibrium Destabilized: Fiduciary Duties Under the
Uniform Limited Liability Company Act, 25 STETSON L. REV. 417 (1995); Dale A.
Oesterle, Subcurrents in LLC Statutes: Limiting the Discretion of State Courts to
Restructure the Internal Affairs of Small Business, 66 U. COLO. L. REV. 881
(1995).
8. See Gelfman v. Weeden Investors, L.P., 859 A.2d 89, 114 (Del. Ch. 2004); see also
Callison, supra note 7, at 461-62 (criticizing the gross negligence formulation in
light of the decision in Gelfman).
9. See Sandra K. Miller et al., An Empirical Glimpse into Limited Liability Compa-
nies: Assessing the Need to Protect Minority Investors, 43 Am. Bus. L.J. 609, 622
(2006) [hereinafter Miller, Empirical Glimpse] (finding that 85% of respondents
indicated that they sometimes or often have formed no-frills or simple LLC agree-
ments in a study of practitioners contractual practices in Colorado, Delaware,
Kentucky, Minnesota, Montana, and New York); see also Sandra K. Miller, A New
Direction for LLC Research in a Contractarian Legal Environment, 76 S. CAL. L.
REv. 351, 383 (2003) [hereinafter Miller, New Direction] (graphically demonstrat-
ing that approximately two-thirds of practitioners believed that many LLC agree-
ments are based on form agreements that are not extensively negotiated in a
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surfaced that arguably create a need to increase rather than decrease
the accountability of management.10
This Article raises two major questions. First, should the duty of
care be articulated as a duty to refrain from grossly negligent conduct,
or is there a need for a more demanding standard such as one based
upon negligence and/or reasonable care with perhaps a separate stat-
utory articulation of the business judgment rule? Second, should ex-
tensive contractual freedom be granted permitting the LLC operating
agreement to indemnify the LLC managers for all types of violations,
or should the LLC statute prohibit the LLC operating agreement from
indemnifying managers for certain specific types of misconduct (i.e.
prohibiting indemnification for intentional wrongful acts or criminal
violations, the sustained failure to perform one's duties, or the taking
of improper distributions)? Following this introduction in Part I, Part
II addresses the policy goals served by the duty of care. Part III ex-
plores the advantages and drawbacks of partnership and corporate
models of the duty of care and critiques the duty to refrain from
grossly negligent conduct-the standard contained in the Revised
Uniform Partnership Act." Part IV examines existing LLC duty of
care provisions and case law and explores the disconnect between the
standard of care one would expect of one discharging highly important
services and the gross negligence standard.
study of contractual practices in California, Delaware, New York, and
Pennsylvania).
10. See Sandra K. Miller, The Role of the Court in Balancing Contractual Freedom
With the Need for Mandatory Constraints on Opportunistic and Abusive Conduct
in the LLC, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 1609, 1629-31 (2004) (discussing differing judicial
approaches to cases involving opportunistic conduct); Sarbanes-Oxley Act of
2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified as amended in scattered sec-
tions 11, 15, and 18 U.S.C. and other chapters (2006)); Lawrence A. Cunningham,
Too Big to Fail: Moral Hazard in Auditing and the Need to Restructure the Indus-
try Before it Unravels, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1698, 1698-1700 (2006) (discussing in
a symposium on litigation reform the accounting scandals, their impact on the
auditing industry and the need for fundamental reforms); Dana M. Muir & Cindy
A. Schipani, New Standards of Director Loyalty and Care in the Post-Enron Era:
Are Some Shareholders More Equal Than Others? 8 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS & PUB. POL'Y
279, 280-81 (2005) (considering the intersection of federal securities laws, state
corporate laws, and ERISA obligations in the post-Enron legal environment); see
also William W. Bratton, Private Standards, Public Governance: A New Look at
the Financial Accounting Standards Board, 48 B.C. L. REV. 5, 5-6 (2007) (observ-
ing the renewed emphasis on public and private collaboration in governance). A
number of LLC cases have involved attempts to usurp business opportunities,
squeeze-out LLC investors, or other allegations involving alleged breaches of fi-
duciary duties. See Fine v. Bork, No. CV010808586, 2002 WL 207538, at *1-2
(Conn. Super. Ct. Jan. 16, 2002); VGS, Inc. v. Castiel, No. C.A. 17995, 2004 WL
1277372, at *4 (Del. Ch. Aug. 31, 2000); Solar Cells, Inc. v. True N. Partners,
LLC, No. Civ.A. 19477, 2002 WL 749163, at *5 (Del. Ch. Apr. 25, 2002); Anest v.
Audino, 773 N.E.2d 202, 210 (Ill. App. Ct. 2002).
11. See UNIF. P'SHIp ACT (1997).
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Part V of this Article recommends that the duty of care be statuto-
rily defined as a duty to act reasonably, subject to the business judg-
ment rule-the language that the author vigorously supported as a
member of the NCCUSL Drafting Committee and the formulation
that was ultimately adopted in the Revised Uniform Limited Liability
Company Act. This position is endorsed largely because it is particu-
larly appropriate to the LLC manager who may assume operational,
officer-like duties as well as policy decision-making responsibilities as-
sociated with a corporate board of directors.12 It is a standard that
fulfills the socializing role of the duty of care by conveying the impor-
tant social cue that responsible managerial conduct is expected of
management-a message made all the more important because of the
significant role LLCs now play in providing goods and services as well
as quasi-governmental functions. 13 Also, it holds the promise of pro-
viding appropriate equitable remedies on a timely basis, thus enabling
investors to intervene to remove entrenched management before the
misconduct has deteriorated to the point of becoming reckless or in-
tentionally harmful.14
II. POLICY GOALS
Many views have been expressed as to how to best formulate the
duty of care applicable to LLC managers and corporate directors.15 To
be sound, the recommended standard must rest upon an accurate un-
derstanding of the role played by LLCs in the economy, a grasp of ex-
12. See infra Part IV.A.2.
13. See infra Part IV.B.
14. See infra Part IV.C.
15. See Brian Dean Abramson, Why the Limited Liability Company Should Sound
the Death Knell of the Application of the "Nexus of Contracts" Theory of Corpora-
tions, 1 FIU L. REV. 185, 228-29 (2006) (discussing fiduciary duties in the LLC
and indicating that at least one case denies the existence of fiduciary duties in
the LLG); Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Duty of Good Faith in Corporate Law, 31
DEL. J. CORP. L. 1, 27 (2006) (discussing the director's duty to act reasonably and
elaborating on the duty of good faith under Delaware law); Deborah A. DeMott,
Breach of Fiduciary Duty: On Justifiable Expectations of Loyalty and Their Con-
sequences, 48 Amiz. L. REV. 925, 935-36 (2006) (suggesting that fiduciary duties
come into play where there are justifiable expectations of loyalty, rather than the
possession of a critical resource that belongs to the beneficiary); Daniel S.
Kleinberger, Direct Versus Derivative and the Law of Limited Liability Compa-
nies, 58 BAYLOR L. REV. 63, 111-12 (2006) (discussing requirement to show a di-
rect injury in the context of closely-held LLCs); Stephen J. Lubben & Alana J.
Darnell, Delaware's Duty of Care, 31 DEL. J. CORP. L. 589, 630 (2006) (reviewing
Delaware's case law on the duty of care and recommending against robust judi-
cial scrutiny of director conduct); Christopher A. Wray & Robert K. Hur, Corpo-
rate Criminal Prosecution in a Post-Enron World: The Thompson Memo in Theory
and Practice, 43 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1095, 1105-06 (2006) (discussing the empha-
sis on internal controls for maintaining compliance with standards for sound cor-
porate governance).
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isting practices used by the LLC, and a clear conception of the
overarching goals to be served by the legal duty of care. Specific policy
objectives must then be identified that will help achieve the desired
goals. The need for a balanced approach to the duty of care emerges
as a central theme when one considers the competing policy objectives
at stake.16
It is suggested that LLCs play a vital role in a wide range of eco-
nomic activities and that the duty of care selected must be capable of
being applied in a variety of settings amidst diverse management
structures. Duty of care provisions must further the over-arching pol-
icy goals of fostering investor confidence and controlling agency
costs.' 7 Also, the duty of care provisions must foster the confidence of
other stakeholders as well, whether suppliers, customers, employees,
trade creditors, or the public at large.' 8
To further the broad goal of promoting investor confidence in
LLCs, the legal system must provide investors with a legal standard of
conduct that encourages responsible managerial conduct and provides
legal recourse for serious violations.19 Toward this end, the duty of
care should include an appropriate statement describing the care ex-
pected, an articulation of LLC standards of managerial conduct that
16. PETER C. CLAPMAN ET. AL., INTERIM REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON CAPITAL MAR-
KETS xi (Nov. 30, 2006), available at http://www.capmktsreg.orgpdfs/11.30Com-
mitteeInterimReportREV2.pdf (discussing the need for a balanced approach to
corporate governance).
17. See Richard A. Posner, An Economic Approach to Legal Procedure and Judicial
Administration, in FOUNDATIONS OF THE ECONOMIC APPROACH TO LAw 133-38
(Avery Wiener Katz ed., Oxford Univ. Press 1998) (discussing legal costs and the
goals of reducing costs and the settlement of cases); see also William J. Carney,
The Costs of Being Public After Sarbanes-Oxley: The Irony of "Going Private," 55
EMORY L.J. 141, 147 (2006) (discussing the cost of increased regulation and ob-
serving a rise in Director and Officer Insurance from twenty-five percent to forty
percent for financially healthy companies and a rise of 300% and 400% for finan-
cially unhealthy corporations); see generally Francesco Parisi, Introduction: The
Legacy of Richard A. Posner and the Methodology of Law and Economics, in RICH-
ARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF THE LAW xxvii-xxviii (Francesco
Parisi ed., Edward Elgar Publ'g Ltd. 2000).
18. Kevin Keasey et al., Introduction: The Corporate Governance Problem-Compet-
ing Diagnosis and Solutions, in CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, 8-9 (Kevin Keasey et
al. eds., Oxford Univ. Press 1997) (observing that the stakeholder model of the
firm explicitly recognizes that others besides the shareholders have an interest or
stake in the long-term success of the entity). See Robin Paul Mallory, Adam
Smith and the Modern Discourse of Law and Economics, in ADAM SMITH AND THE
PHILOSOPHY OF LAW AND ECONOMICS 113, 114-15 (Robin Paul Malloy and Jerry
Evensky eds., Kluwer Academic Publishers 1994) (observing that in contrast to
John Locke's theory of the social contract, Adam Smith offers concepts of author-
ity and utility and believes authority is necessary for decision-making and dis-
pute resolution).
19. See CLAPMAN, supra note 16, at xii (discussing the importance of giving investors
confidence that there is a legal system in place that will enforce their interests).
2008]
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will appropriately socialize the business community, rules that offer
an effective means of assessing appropriate damages, and a mecha-
nism for restraining certain harmful transactions or offering equitable
relief.20 The ultimate goal is to foster investor confidence through a
legal regime that creates and enforces reasonable expectations of re-
sponsible management conduct.
A. The Public Interest and the Economic Role of the LLC
The significance of the economic role played by the LLC and by
private businesses generally is often overlooked. A great deal of atten-
tion has focused on the public corporation in recent years as director
misconduct in the context of the public company has seized the spot-
light.21 However, privately owned LLCs are playing an increasingly
important role in the economy as more public companies go private
and as more new businesses are formed. Given the growing number of
LLCs and the breadth of their activities, society at large has a vested
interest in the standard of conduct applicable to the LLC manager and
in the ultimate success of the LLC itself.
The emergence of the LLC is astounding. More businesses of all
types are forming as LLCs than as other non-corporate entities. LLCs
were recently reported as accounting for more new business filings
than corporations in twenty-nine states.2 2 Based on the 2006 filing
reports by the International Association of Commercial Administra-
tors, LLC domestic and foreign filings exceeded filings of business and
professional corporations in thirty-nine states.23 In Delaware, the ra-
20. See BRIEFING MEMORANDUM FROM THE REPORTERS TO THE DRAFTING COMMITTEE
ON AMENDMENTS TO THE UNIF. LTD. LLAB. Co. ACT 6-7 (2003), available at http://
www.law.upenn.edu/bll/ulc/ullca/may2003memo.pdf (discussing the need to de-
velop effective remedies for breach of fiduciary duties and for oppressive conduct
by controlling owners).
21. See Andrew A. Lundgren, Sarbanes-Oxley, Then Disney: The Post-Scandal Corpo-
rate-Governance Plot Thickens, 8 DEL. L. REV. 195, 196 (2006) (discussing recent
accounting scandals and observing the prominent niche that Delaware has en-
joyed with regard to corporate governance); see also Susanna Kim Ripkin, The
Dangers and Drawbacks of the Disclosure Antidote: Toward a More Substantive
Approach to Securities Regulation, 58 BAYLOR L. REV. 139, 146-47 (2006) (high-
lighting recent accounting scandals and criticizing the emphasis on disclosure as
a means of regulating the securities market).
22. Howard M. Friedman, The Silent LLC Revolution-The Social Cost of Academic
Neglect, 38 CREIGHTON L. REV. 35, 37-38 (2004).
23. See infra app. I; INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF COMMERCIAL ADMINISTRATORS,
ANNUAL REPORT OF THE JURISDICTIONS (2007), available at http://www.iaca.org/
downloads/AnnualReports/2007_IACA AR.pdf (reporting statistical data on the
number of business and professional corporations and limited liability companies
filed during the year in each state). Written inquiries can be addressed to Mike
Ricchio, President, International ASsociation of Commercial Administrators, P.O.
Box 40234, Olympia, WA 98504-0234, mricchio@secstate.wa.gov, President Elect
Kathy Berg, P.O. Box 146705, P.O. Box 146705, Salt Lake City, UT 84114-6705,
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tio of LLC filings to new corporate filings was 97,942 to 34,384 or ap-
proximately 2.85 to 1. In Colorado, the ratio was 2.51 to 1 and in
Louisiana, it was 4.11 to 1.24 The breadth of LLC activities is impres-
sive. They provide a broad array of critical services including the pro-
vision of private nursing home care, the furnishing of electrical power,
the only provision of global satellite voice and data solutions, and legal
services. 2 5 Small private firms continue to play a critical role in the
economy, with small business (firms with less than 500 employees)
representing as much as 99.7% of all employer firms and accounting
for sixty to eighty percent of new jobs annually. 2 6
As early as 1996, LLCs were identified as operating in numerous
fields of business. 27 A sample of 1,252 LLCs revealed LLCs engaged
in engineering and management support services, real estate, con-
struction and general contracting, investments, retail, health services,
amusement and recreation, agricultural production, restaurants, and
leasing services. 28 LLC litigation has involved LLCs engaged in di-
verse businesses ranging from real estate2 9 to beer distribution.3 0
Many LLCs provide services that are critical to the functioning of
modern society and some LLCs even perform quasi-governmental ser-
vices. 3 1 LLCs now provide fundamental functions that go to the heart
of society's infrastructure. Some LLCs are owned by public companies
kberg@utah.gov or Robert Lindsey, P.O. Box 1197 (23218), Richmond, VA 23219,
Robert.Lindsey@scc.viginia.gov.
24. See infra app. I.
25. See Foster-Thompson, LLC v. Thompson, No. 8:04-CV-2128T30EAJ, 2005 WL
30935 10, at *1-2 (M.D. Fla. Nov. 18, 2005) (involving the provision of electrical
power services in Iraq); Willoughby Rehab. & Health Care Ctr., LLC v. Webster,
No. 12431-04, 2006 WL 3068961, at *1 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Oct. 26, 2006) (involving
nursing home industry); see Iridium Satellite LLC, available at http://www.irid-
ium.com (provider of global satellite voice and data solutions organized as an
LLC).
26. UNITED STATES CHAMBER OF COMMERCE STATISTICS AND RESEARCH CENTER,
UNITED STATES BUSINESS FACTS 4, available at http://www.uschamber.com (use
Search function, type in Business Facts) (last visited Feb. 7, 2006).
27. See Conrad S. Ciccotello & C. Terry Grant, LLCs and LLPs: Organizing to Deliver
Professional Services, Bus. HORIZONS, Mar.-Apr. 1999, at 85.
28. Id. at 89.
29. Chaline Estates, Inc. v. Furcraft Assocs., 718 N.Y.S.2d 53, 54 (App. Div. 2000)
(involving managing owners of a real estate partnership who tried to transfer
real property to a new LLC without notifying a twenty percent owner).
30. Anest v. Audino, 773 N.E.2d 202 (Ill. App. Ct. 2002) (involving litigation over an
exclusive beer distributorship).
31. Foster-Thompson, LLC v. Thompson, No. 8:04-CV-2128T30EAJ, 2005 WL
3093510, at *1-2 (M.D. Fla. Nov. 18, 2005) (involving a suit by a Florida LLC
against its manager where the LLC had entered into a contract with the United




and provide important telecommunication services. 32 In other in-
stances, LLCs have provided functions requiring a special degree of
trust. For example, some LLCs serve as repositories for investments
of individual retirement funds33 while others operate nursing
homes.34
Most LLCs are privately owned; however, LLCs may be the subject
of private placements. 3 5 They may elect to become publicly traded.36
If publicly traded, the LLC is subject to special tax rules and may be
taxed as a corporation. 3 7 Finally, publicly owned companies often find
it appropriate to invest in LLCs and/or use LLCs within their corpo-
rate structures.
Given the growth of LLCs and the sweeping breadth of LLC activi-
ties, the public at large has a vested interest in the effectiveness of the
legal framework within which the LLC operates. While the primary
focus of business entity governance is on the relationship between in-
vestors and management rather than on the regulation of the business
at large, the governance framework should work compatibly in the
larger scheme of things to promote the broad public interest.
B. Investor Confidence
The two major prongs of business entity governance include the
duty of loyalty and the duty of care.38 The duty of loyalty demands
that the actor act honestly and in a manner that furthers the best
interests of the business entity. 39 The duty of care requires that the
32. See FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION, PUBLIC NOTICE DA 06-1768, DOMES-
TIC SECTION 214 APPLICATION FILED FOR TRANSFER OF CONTROL OF HECTOR COM-
MUNICATIONS CORPORATION, INC., ARVIG ENTERPRISES, INC. AND NEW JLM
TELECOM, INC. WC DOCKET No. 06-166 (Sept. 5, 2006), available at http:fl
hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs-public/attachmatch/DA-06-1768Al.pdf.
33. See Equity Trust Company, http://trustetc.com/self-directed-ira/private-place-
ments.html (last visited Oct. 27, 2006) (providing an advertisement for selecting
the services of Equity Trust to self-direct retirement funds).
34. See Willoughby Rehab. & Health Care Ctr., LLC v. Webster, No. 12431-04, 2006
WL 3068961, at *1 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Oct. 26, 2006) (involving nursing homes and
raising the question of whether the failure to provide consent vis-A-vis a borrow-
ing constituted a violation of fiduciary duty).
35. See Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77d (2007); see also HENRY R. CHEESEMAN,
THE LEGAL ENVIRONMENT OF BUSINESS AND ONLINE COMMERCE 542-43 (Pearson
Prentice Hall 5th ed. 2007) (discussing the use of private placements as transac-
tions exempt from the registration requirements of the Securities Act).
36. See I.R.C. § 7704 (2000).
37. See id. § 7704(c)(1)-(2) (generally treating publicly traded partnerships as corpo-
rations for federal income tax purposes but exempting such partnerships from
corporate treatment where 90 percent of gross income is passive in nature such
as interest, dividends, rents, and similar types of income).
38. See CORPORATE DIRECTOR'S GUIDEBOOK: COMMITTEE ON CORPORATE LAWS 12-17
(4th ed. 2004).
39. See id. at 14-17.
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actor act carefully in carrying out his managerial or oversight du-
ties.4 0 These fundamental standards are the foundation of investor
confidence that the LLC will be managed with honesty and care.
The need for a balanced approach to the duty of care comes clearly
into focus when one considers the many important policy objectives to
be served by the duty of care. As discussed below, the role of the duty
of care is to provide a descriptive standard of conduct, to fulfill social-
izing, expressive and deterrent functions, to provide remedies, and to
encourage service by affording an appropriate degree of judicial
intervention. 4 1
C. The Descriptive Role
The first specific objective served by the duty of care is perhaps the
most obvious, yet one that is frequently overlooked. To serve as a
guideline that reflects positive social values and inspires investor con-
fidence, the duty of care must be sufficiently descriptive, yet capable of
application in diverse settings and diverse management structures. It
has been argued that the duty of care is so context-specific that a sin-
gle statutory standard cannot be developed. 4 2 However, sufficient
flexibility has long been built into the corporate standard of care and
can be similarly integrated into a standard applicable to LLCs.43
Clearly, whether the investment involves ice cream parlors or nuclear
plants, from the investor's viewpoint management should be attentive
and responsible regardless of the activity undertaken. Nevertheless,
specific management standards and the consequences of irresponsible
management may differ depending upon the nature of the firm. The
expectations of management may also differ depending upon the allo-
cation of duties under the LLC operating agreement. The duty of care
must be capable of providing a broad general guideline for conduct
and be susceptible to specific tailoring to individual facts and
circumstances.
It is particularly challenging for the duty of care to be appropri-
ately descriptive in light of the diverse management structures em-
ployed in the LLC. Although early LLCs were frequently member-
managed, LLCs may now have a Board of Directors or any other man-
agement structure and still achieve flow-through taxation. Because of
40. See id. at 12-14.
41. See generally Thomas C. Lee, Comment, Limiting Corporate Directors' Liability:
Delaware's Section 102(b)(7) and the Erosion of the Director's Duty of Care, 136 U.
PA. L. REV. 239, 261-69 (1987) (mapping out the social policy objectives served by
the duty of care).
42. See Callison, supra note 7, at 455.
43. See AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE § 4.01, at
151-52 (1994) [hereinafter PRINCIPLES] (discussing the flexibility built into the
standard of care that expects the director to act with the care of an ordinarily
prudent person in a like position under similar circumstances).
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the diversity found in the LLC management structure, a duty of care
specific to "directors" and "officers" may be inappropriate. Instead,
the duty of care of LLC managers should be an integrated standard
encompassing operational officer-like duties and director-like duties
involving business entity policymaking and oversight.
D. The Socializing, Expressive, and Deterrent Roles
The duty of care serves important expressive functions and should
effectively function to socialize the business community, to express
community values, to inspire its members to conform to the standard
that has been established, to deter misconduct, and to generally en-
force reasonable expectations that management will conduct itself
responsibly.44 The duty of care may be viewed as a standard that pro-
motes an internal point of view that promotes appropriately responsi-
ble managerial conduct. 45 Alternatively, the duty of care may be
regarded as a third party expression that coordinates and encourages
careful and thoughtful managerial behavior, thus serving a powerful
expressive role of socially appropriate conduct.4 6 At the same time, to
avoid being counter-productive the duty of care should not be formu-
lated in a manner that dampens risk-taking behavior where the cir-
44. See John C. Coffee, Jr., Litigation and Corporate Governance: An Essay on Steer-
ing Between Scylla and Charybdis, 52 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 789, 796-97 (1984)
(discussing the educational role played by the duty of care); see also Lee, supra
note 41 (discussing the rationales underlying the duty of care).
45. See Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, Trust, Trustworthiness, and the Behav-
ioral Foundations of Corporate Law, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1735, 1736 (2001) [here-
inafter Blair, Trust] (discussing the important link between fiduciary duties and
the fostering of trustworthy behavior); see also DeMott, supra note 15, at 926
(discussing the role fiduciary duties play in preserving expectations of behavior
that is loyal to the interests of others); Scott J. Shapiro, What is the Internal Point
of View? 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 1157, 1157-59 (2006) (indicating that in contrast to
the sanctions-based approach, the approach taken by H.L.A. Hart in The Concept
of Law emphasizes the internal point of view and theorizes that the actor accepts
the rules and makes efforts to comply with them); Owen D. Jones & Timothy H.
Goldsmith, Law and Behavioral Biology, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 405, 500 (2005) (dis-
cussing the prominent role that behavioral models play in the law and suggesting
that the impact of biological forces be integrated into the analysis of the law and
behavior); Sarah Helene Duggin & Stephen M. Goldman, Restoring Trust in Cor-
porate Directors: The Disney Standard and the "New" Good Faith, 56 Am. U. L.
REV. 211, 274 (2006) (emphasizing the importance of having trust in directors
and discussing the requirement that director conduct reflect good faith as a po-
tential tool for restoring trust in corporate governance).
46. See Richard H. McAdams, A Focal Point Theory of Expressive Law, 86 VA. L. REV.
1649, 1671-72 (2000) (observing that the law provides a third-party communica-
tion that creates a focal point that coordinates individual activity and that the
expression of the law itself plays a powerful role in influencing behavior, al-
though sanctions may still be needed).
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cumstances require it.47 Thus, the need for a balanced legal standard
emerges as one considers the competing needs to encourage careful
conduct without unduly chilling appropriate risk-taking behaviors.
E. The Remedial Role
The third objective of the duty of care is to provide appropriate
remedies. 48 The appropriate remedy could mean reasonable damages
to compensate the injured party.4 9 It could include injunctive power
to restrain certain proposed transactions. Clearly, investor confidence
will be fostered if the investor can be assured that there will be a rem-
edy for managerial misconduct. At the same time, however, respect
for the legal system may be compromised if the law invites and re-
wards excessive litigation and legal costs.
F. Encouraging Service and Appropriate Judicial
Intervention
Another fundamental goal of the duty of care is to provide a stan-
dard of conduct that will promote responsible behavior while being
cost effective to the business community and practical when put to the
test.50 The duty of care selected should not be so demanding that it
would deter managers from serving or result in undue administrative
burdens on the business. 5 1 A standard of care that is set unrealisti-
47. See Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Divergence of Standards of Conduct and Stan-
dards of Review in Corporate Law, 62 FORDHAM L. REV. 437, 445 (1993) (observ-
ing that it is often in the shareholders' interests for directors or officers to choose
the riskier of two alternative decisions).
48. Daniel S. Keinberger, Seven Points to Explain Why the Law Ought Not to Allow
the Elimination of Fiduciary Duty Within Closely Held Business-Cardozo is
Dead: We Have Killed Him 6-8 (William Mitchell Coll. of Law, Legal Studies Re-
search Series, Working Paper No. 61, 2006) available at http://www.ssrn.com/ab-
stract=948234 (discussing the importance of providing appropriate remedies).
49. See Lee, supra note 41, at 261-69 (discussing the rationales underlying the duty
of care).
50. See R.H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386, 390-97 (1937) (argu-
ing that marketing costs are saved by forming a firm); see also R.H. Coase, The
Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1, 18 (1960) (observing that direct govern-
ment regulation will not necessarily offer better results than leaving the problem
to be solved by the market or the firm). These results have led to the observation
that putting aside transaction costs, the parties will tend to bargain in a way that
will generate the optimum result and that the market may be more efficient at
solving problems than the government. See Richard A. Posner, Nobel Laureate:
Ronald Coase and Methodology, 7 J. OF EcON. PERSPS. 195, 198 (1993) (discussing
the works of Ronald Coase and agreeing with Coase's observation concerning the
effectiveness of the market as compared with the government).
51. See Ginger Carroll, Comment, Thinking Small: Adjusting Regulatory Burdens In-
curred by Small Public Companies Seeking to Comply with the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act, 58 ALA. L. REV. 443, 452-53 (2006) (emphasizing the costs of increased scru-
tiny of corporate governance); see also Aaron D. Jones, Corporate Officer Wrong-
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cally high could be as destructive as a standard set too low. If the
standard and/or penalties are too severe, judges may be reluctant to
impose liability in all but the most egregious situations and may inap-
propriately dismiss worthy cases.
The standard of care should be carefully calibrated to avoid exces-
sive judicial intervention. It is hardly desirable or practical to seek
judicial intervention whenever a manager's performance dips below
the expected norm.5 2 Ample room should be left for the use of non-
judicial means of addressing managerial misconduct such as through
terminations or firings, or through other non-judicial punitive
measures.
53
Finally, the standard of care should select an appropriate alloca-
tion of legal costs as between the entity on one hand and the individ-
ual on the other hand. In some cases it may make sense to permit the
entity to indemnify the individual for certain violations, while in other
cases it may be inappropriate to do so. One interesting approach sug-
gested by the American Law Institute is to limit the personal liability
of directors to an amount equal to his or her salary where the violation
does not involve a knowing and culpable violation of law, a conscious
disregard for duties, or a sustained and unexcused pattern of
inattention.5 4
III. PARTNERSHIP AND CORPORATE MODELS
As discussed above, the duty of care should successfully satisfy the
descriptive, socializing, and remedial functions of the law, without im-
posing large costs or dampening the incentive of management to
serve. The contemporary partnership and corporate models for the
standard of care offer a starting point for the development of an effec-
tive standard of care for the LLC manager. However, each model has
shortcomings when one evaluates the extent to which it serves the
fundamental policy objectives of the duty of care.
The modern partnership model for the standard of care contained
in the Revised Uniform Partnership Act states that the partner's duty
doing and the Fiduciary Duties of Corporate Officers under Delaware Law, 44 AM.
Bus. L.J. 475, 478 (2007) (discussing "both what state law says and what it
should say about the duties and responsibilities of corporate officers").
52. See Lawrence A. Hamermesh & Gilchrist Sparks, III, Corporate Officers and the
Business Judgment Rule: A Reply to Professor Johnson, 60 Bus. LAw. 865, 870-75
(2005) (addressing the benefits of the business judgment rule). But see Lyman
P.Q. Johnson, Faith and Faithfulness in Corporate Theory, 56 CATH. U. L. REV. 1,
11-14 (2006) (discussing the business judgment rule and observing with appar-
ent disapproval that very little is expected of directors).
53. See Jones, supra note 51, at 512.
54. See PRINCIPLES, supra note 43, § 7.38.
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is limited to refraining from grossly negligent conduct.5 5 However,
gross negligence has been defined as conduct close to recklessness in-
volving a "devil-may-care" attitude, 56 and as such, sets an extremely
low threshold for acceptable business conduct. 57 In fact, the challenge
of overcoming the business judgment rule and establishing gross neg-
ligence has been characterized as "a near-Herculean" task.58 To the
extent that gross negligence may be equated with recklessness, one
may argue that gross negligence as a standard of conduct fails to sat-
isfy the descriptive, socializing, and remedial functions of the duty of
care.
The gross negligence formulation improperly conflates or collapses
the duty of care with the level of judicial review and consequently
loses touch with the fundamental standard of due care that has long
governed the conduct of paid agents. 59 Judicial deference to business
decision-making may well be appropriate when business decision-
making is involved. 60 In such cases, the result may be the imposition
of damages when conduct has been grossly negligent. However, it
does not necessarily follow that only grossly negligent conduct should
entitle a plaintiff to remedies, whether legal or equitable, when opera-
55. See UNIF. P'SHIP ACT § 404 (1997); see also CORNELL UNIVERSITY LAW SCHOOL,
LEGAL INFORMATION INSTITUTE, UNIF. LAWS, available at http://www.
law.cornell.edu/uniform/vol7.html#partn (last visited June 6, 2007) (containing
listing of states that have adopted the 1997 Uniform Partnership Act).
56. See Gelfman v. Weeden Investors, L.P., 859 A.2d 89, 114 (Del. Ch. 2004).
57. It is somewhat surprising that gross negligence has been equated with reckless-
ness. As noted in Indiana's corporate statute, gross negligence typically involves
more than ordinary inadvertence but less than conscious disregard or indiffer-
ence. See IND. CODE ANN. § 23-1-35-1 cmt. e (LexisNexis 1999) (citing WILLIAM L.
PROSSER & W. PAGE KEETON, THE LAW OF TORTS 212 (5th ed. 1984); see also Calli-
son, supra note 7, at 460-63 (defining the gross negligence standard and detail-
ing recent cases failing to find conduct arising to the standard of gross
negligence).
58. In re Tower Air, Inc., 416 F.3d 229, 238 (3d Cir. 2005) (because of the presump-
tion of the business judgment rule the plaintiff must show that no reasonable
business purpose could possibly have authorized the transaction in question).
59. See Eisenberg, supra note 47, at 440-41 (discussing the standard of conduct as
the duty of care that an ordinarily prudent person would reasonably be expected
to exercise in a like position, and the standard for judicial review which dictates
the degree of scrutiny that a court is likely to exercise in the review of the conduct
in question); see also Norwood P. Beveridge, Jr., Duty of Care: The Partnership
Cases, 15 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 753, 765-66 (1990) (arguing that ordinary negli-
gence is the relevant and appropriate standard of care in the case of partners).
60. Compare Gries Sports Enters, Inc. v. Cleveland Browns Football Co., 496 N.E.2d
959, 966-68 (Ohio 1986) (involving a decision to approve the acquisition of an-
other company) with Francis v. United Jersey Bank, 432 A.2d 814, 817 (N.J. Sup.
Ct. 1981) (involving the failure to properly oversee the conduct of directors who
misappropriated funds). The American Law Institute observes that the business
judgment rule presupposes that there has been a conscious exercise of judgment
and has no application in a failure to act or failure to oversee situation. See PRIN-
CIPLES, supra note 43, at 174-75.
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tional conduct and/or oversight responsibilities are at issue. Also, the
collapse of the standard of care with the level ofjudicial review fails to
permit the type of fine-tuning that may lead to more judicial scrutiny
when there are passive investors and less judicial scrutiny when all
partners participate. 6 1
The corporate model for the standard of care based on the Revised
Model Business Corporation Act better serves the socializing and cost-
containing objectives of the duty of care than the model adopted under
the Revised Uniform Partnership Act. The corporate model retains an
aspirational standard of conduct based on the exercise of reasonable
care. However, litigation costs are limited by imposing liability only
in the event of gross negligence. The scheme thus preserves the so-
cializing function of the duty of care and also leaves open the opportu-
nity to seek equitable remedies for misconduct that is less extreme
than gross negligence. However, the corporate model has been criti-
cized as not providing sufficiently stringent behavioral controls be-
cause of the extreme deference shown for the exercise of business
judgment. 62 In addition, it has been criticized for establishing too low
of a standard with regard to oversight responsibilities. 6 3 Also, the Re-
vised Model Business Corporation Act contains separate provisions for
officers and directors, a distinction that may be ill suited to the multi-
plicity of management structures housed in the LLC.64
The "Mandatory Core/Reasonable Care Approach" recommended
for the LLC seeks to improve the shortcomings of the partnership and
corporate models by introducing a reasonable care standard of con-
duct, thus differentiating the substantive standard from the standard
of judicial review by codifying a business judgment rule to help clarify
that the business judgment rule applies when business decision-mak-
ing is involved, but that generally, the exercise of due care is ex-
pected.6 5 Thus, the application of the business judgment rule would
be appropriately confined and the standard for oversight responsibil-
ity would be based on due care. The proposal outlined in Part IV ad-
dresses the LLC's need for cost containment and flexibility by
permitting some contractual modification of the duty of care and by
permitting the limitation of damages to the actor's annual salary in
61. More judicial scrutiny may also be appropriate in other contexts (i.e. where the
active LLC member is a minority investor/manager who actively manages the
LLC and alleges a squeeze-out by a controlling member) however the present
discussion is confined to the duty of care.
62. See Johnson, supra note 52, at 11-14 (observing that little is expected of
directors).
63. Id.
64. Compare REVISED MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 8.30 applicable to directors with
§ 8.42 applicable to officers.
65. See infra Part V.
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cases of violations not involving dishonesty and not involving extreme
forms of negligence. 6 6
A. The Shortcomings of the Revised Uniform Partnership
Act
The original Uniform Partnership Act did not contain an express
standard of care. 6 7 Some commentators have argued that the part-
ner's standard of care has always been based on the less stringent
duty to refrain from grossly negligent conduct,68 while others have
stressed that partnership law has its roots in agency law and the part-
ner's standard of care is that of the agent, based on the use of due
care. 69 At least one commentator maintains that the duty of care in
the partnership was bifurcated.70 Under this view, the partner's con-
duct as an agent was subject to the "ordinary care" standard but the
partner's conduct as a manager was premised upon the lower stan-
dard of "gross negligence" by virtue of the application of the business
judgment rule.71
A few cases support this bifurcation analysis. Recovery was denied
on the grounds that the applicable standard of care expected in the
partnership was based on due care in a few cases in which a negligent
partner sought indemnification or contribution from the partner-
ship.7 2 Where a negligent partner sued the partnership for indemni-
66. See PRINCIPLES, supra note 43, § 7.19 (providing for the limitation on damages to
the annual compensation of the actor for violations of the duty of care that do not
involve knowing and culpable violations, violations not showing a conscious dis-
regard for duties, and violations not amounting to a sustained and unexcused
pattern of inattention).
67. See UNIF. P'SHIP ACT (1914).
68. See Gerard C. Martin, Duties of Care Under the Revised Uniform Partnership Act,
65 U. CHI. L. REV. 1307, 1311-12 (1998) (discussing the troubling controversy
that has surrounded the duty of care in the partnership due to the principles of
agency and the business judgment rule).
69. See id.; see also Miller, supra note 7, at 48 (stating that in light of the fact that
partnership and agency law are interwoven, there is support for the view that
partners must act with standard care and skill); Beveridge, Jr., supra note 59, at
754 (arguing that the partners duty to use the care of an ordinarily prudent per-
son is well-recognized in English and American law and that the due care stan-
dard as well as the business judgment rule should be included in the Revised
Uniform Partnership Act).
70. See Jean H. Toal & W. Bratton Riley, Fiduciary Duties of Partners and Limited
Liabiliiy Company Members Under South Carolina Law: A Perspective from the
Bench, 56 S.C. L. REV. 275, 280-81 (2004) (indicating that partners assume the
role of agent in conducting the ordinary course of business of the partnership and
assume the role of manager making organizational decisions, thus recommending
that the duty should be bifurcated in terms of the role as agent and the role as
manager).
71. See id.
72. See Martin, supra note 68, at 1311-12.
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fication, recovery was denied in one medical malpractice case.7 3
Similarly, where a partner had driven negligently, the partner's re-
quest for contribution was denied.74 On the other hand, where part-
ners sued each other for negligent management they were
unsuccessful in recovering on the grounds of ordinary negligence. 75
Overall, however, not all the cases fit neatly into the bifurcation
paradigm. In one omission case, a partner who failed to get insurance
was not liable for the resulting loss ostensibly because the court be-
lieved that a member of a joint venture was not liable to another for
"mere negligence." 76 Yet this was a case involving conduct as an
agent.7 7 Thus, at best, the partnership law prior to the enactment of
the Revised Uniform Partnership Act delivered a mixed message con-
73. See id. at 1312 n.31; Flynn v. Reaves, 218 S.E.2d 661, 663 (1975).
74. See United Brokers' Co. v. Dose, 22 P.2d 204, 205 (Or. 1933).
75. See Ferguson v. Williams, 670 S.W.2d 327, 331 (Tex. App. 1984) (indicating that
negligence in the management of the affairs of a general partnership or joint ven-
ture does not create any right of action); see also Cohen v. Fonseca, 677 So. 2d
1388, 1389 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996) (involving a defendant who made an error in
setting the slab for a guesthouse and observing that in the absence of an agree-
ment there is no liability for ordinary negligence, except that in the present case
there was an agreement); Duffy v. Piazza Constr., 815 P.2d 267, 268-69 (Wash.
Ct. App. 1991) (involving a defendant who submitted proposals for construction of
office space that violated the footage requirements and observing that the co-
venturer would not be liable for mistakes of business judgment but would be lia-
ble where there is injury to the person or property of the co-venturer or where the
venture calls for the exercise of a particular degree of skill).
76. Kartage v. Interocean, 167 So. 2d 76, 76 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1964).
77. Some cases appear to emphasize the duty of loyalty, but stress that partnership
losses resulting from poor judgment or mistakes of judgment are borne by the
partnership. See Johnson v. Weber, 803 P.2d 939, 941 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1990) (in-
volving a limited partnership in which the managing partner failed to success-
fully develop the property but where there was no claim of dishonesty or
disloyalty); Borys v. Rudd, 566 N.E.2d 310, 315-17 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991) (involving
defendant's failure to file tax returns and his settlement of the partnership's
third-party claim, but where there was no claim of fraud or that the defendant
lacked good faith); see also Bane v. Ferguson, 890 F.2d 11, 13-14 (7th Cir. 1989)
(involving a disastrous merger of a law firm and observing that there is no "tort
liability on careless managers for the financial consequences of the collapse of the
firm"). For a discussion of the business judgment rule, see Marwil v. Grubbs, No.
1:03-CV-01165-DFH-VS, 2004 WL 2278751, at *2-3, *9 (S.D. Ind. 2004) (involv-
ing a suit against directors and officers of a church organization that had entered
into risky bargain sales transactions and emphasizing that the business judg-
ment rule requires there to be an informed decision and the exercise of good
faith); Rosenthal v. Rosenthal, 543 A.2d 348, 354 (Me. 1988) (observing that the
jury should have been instructed on the role of the business judgment rule, and
the necessity of defendants' conduct involving fraud or bad faith). See Snell v. De
Land, 27 N.E. 183, 184 (Ill. 1891) (observing that a partner is not an insurer of
the assets and can only be held for a loss of property when such loss occurs from a
willful disregard of duty); Knipe v. Livingston, 57 A. 1130, 1130 (Pa. 1904) (refus-
ing to charge a partner where his unscientific method of bookkeeping resulted in
a misleading presentation of the financial health of the firm); see also Thomas v.
Milfelt, 222 S.W.2d 359, 359, 365 (Miss. Ct. App. 1949) (involving an automobile
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cerning the duty of care, and failed to serve the descriptive function of
the duty of care.
Amidst considerable controversy and disagreement, the drafters of
the Revised Uniform Partnership Act enacted section 404, which pro-
vides that a partner's duty of care is limited to the duty to refrain from
engaging in grossly negligent conduct.7 8 The policy justifications for
this position were apparently that most investors would want to pool
their risks together and that over time, losses for negligence fall
equally on all partners. 79
However, the formulation of the duty of care simply as a duty to
refrain from grossly negligent conduct fails to satisfy the descriptive
and expressive functions of a duty of care since it fails to offer a posi-
tive standard of behavior. It loses entirely the standard of reasonable
care that has long been associated with the standard of conduct for
agents engaged in operations that do not involve business
judgments.8 0
In the context of corporate duties, Professor Melvin Eisenberg has
articulated a distinction between a standard of conduct and the stan-
dard of judicial review.8 1 However, his observation applies with equal
force to the Revised Uniform Partnership Act's formulation of gross
sales and repair business, where the evidence did not indicate that fraud, culpa-
ble negligence, or bad faith existed on part of defendant).
78. UNIF. P'SHIP ACT § 404 (1997). See Allan W. Vestal, Fundamental Contractarian
Error in the Revised Uniform Partnership Act of 1992, 73 B.U. L. REV. 523, 535
(1993).
79. See Donald J. Weidner, Three Policy Decisions Animate Revision of Uniform Part-
nership Act, 46 Bus. LAw. 427, 467-68 (1991) (discussing the final draft of the
Revised Uniform Partnership Act); see also Donald. J. Weidner, The Revised Uni-
form Partnership Act Midstream: Major Policy Decisions, 21 U. TOL. L. REV. 825,
850-54 (1990) [hereinafter Weidner, Midstream] (discussing the controversies
that surfaced in the debate that preceded the adoption of the Revised Uniform
Partnership Act).
80. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 379(1) (1958) (providing that unless oth-
erwise agreed, a paid agent is subject to a duty to the principal to act with stan-
dard care and with the skill which is standard in the locality for the kind of work
which he is employed to perform, and, in addition, to exercise any special skill
that he has); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 8.08 (2006) (providing that a
principal and agent may establish benchmarks or other measures for the effort
and skill to be expected and that an agent's duty of diligence requires the agent to
bring the agent's competence to bear on matters undertaken on behalf of the prin-
cipal); see also Paul Powell, Comment, Dissociating the Fiduciary: Duty Revisions
and the Resulting Confusion in Idaho's New Partnership Law, 36 IDAHO L. REV.
145, 156-57 (1999) (observing that Revised Uniform Partnership Act's duty of
care departs from the ordinary care standard rooted in agency law).
81. See Eisenberg, supra note 47, at 62 (discussing the standard of conduct as the
duty of care that an ordinarily prudent person would reasonably be expected to
exercise in a like position, and the standard for judicial review which dictates the




negligence. The adoption of a gross negligence standard of care con-
flates and improperly combines the stated duty of care (reasonable
care/due care) with the appropriate standard for judicial review (judi-
cial deference to certain business judgments). It is arguably appropri-
ate for courts to show deference to the decision-making process when
reviewing a business decision that requires discretion and a business
judgment. However, when the conduct in question does not involve
business judgments, the business judgment rule should arguably re-
cede and the applicable standard of conduct should emerge as one
based on due care/reasonable care. In other words, a partner who is
driving and falls asleep at the wheel has not exercised a business
judgment, whereas a director who decides whether to accept a propo-
sal for a merger has indeed exercised business discretion.
By merging the standard of care with the standard of judicial re-
view, the Revised Uniform Partnership Act model loses the socializing
and aspirational dimension of the due care standard.82 It also loses
some of its remedial value by eliminating the opportunity of obtaining
equitable relief as an alternative to the award of money damages in
the case of conduct that may fall slightly short of grossly negligent
behavior but which may still be negligent or very negligent.
The separation of the substantive standard of conduct and the
standard ofjudicial review provides the clarity and precision to enable
courts to fine-tune the level of judicial scrutiny depending upon the
facts and circumstances of the case and the relationship of the parties.
It may well be appropriate to provide a reduced level of scrutiny of the
duty of care when all parties participate in management and an in-
creased level of scrutiny in the case of centralized management where
passive investors have imparted a special degree of trust in manag-
ers.8 3 Thus, a number of courts have assumed an active posture in
reviewing fiduciary duties to protect passive investors and recognize
the special level of trust and responsibility that centralized manage-
ment entails.8 4
82. See Lee, supra note 41, at 264 (discussing the role of the duty of care and its
deterrent and remedial functions).
83. Callison, supra note 7, at 473 (arguing against a statutory standard for the LLC
and suggesting that a higher standard of care should be expected where there are
passive investors and trust is placed in centralized management).
84. See Curley v. Brignoli Curley & Roberts Assocs., 746 F. Supp. 1208, 1220
(S.D.N.Y. 1989), affd, 915 F.2d 81 (2d Cir. 1990) (contractual provision exempt-
ing general partner from liability for conduct in good faith did not preclude liabil-
ity for negligence); Roper v. Thomas, 298 S.E.2d 424, 429 (N.C. Ct. App. 1982)
(holding general partners negligent and failing to shelter the general partner
with the business judgment rule); M.D. Bldg. Material Co. v. 910 Constr. Ven-
ture, 579 N.E.2d 1059, 1062-63 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991) (observing that the passive
nature of a limited partner's role has frequently resulted in mismanagement and
self-dealing by general partners); Bassan v. Inv. Exch. Corp., 524 P.2d 233, 238
(Wash. 1974) (observing that limited partners "need to rely on the highest stan-
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The fairness of the gross negligence standard may be open to ques-
tion. The gross negligence standard may not necessarily result in a
fair allocation of loss in the context of some business entities. As Dean
Weidner, Chair of the drafting committee that revised the Uniform
Partnership Act observed:
If a ten percent partner negligently shatters $X of partnership property, why
should ninety percent of the loss be borne by the other partners? What if the
partner's negligence causes a loss to a third party that not only wipes out all
partnership assets but also causes the ninety percent partners to lose their
separate assets? Is the goal of distributive justice among partners served if
the scrupulously careful ninety percent are wiped out and denied the right to
be indemnified by the negligent actor?8 5
Finally, even assuming that the gross negligence standard were
the correct approach for general partnerships, it is not necessarily the
appropriate standard for business entities that lack personal liability
and provide opportunities for passive membership. Since joint and
several liability is imposed upon general partners of a general part-
nership and all partners actively participate, there are already power-
ful forces that monitor partner conduct. In entities such as the LLC,
there may be more of a need to articulate a strong standard of care
because LLC members have limited liability and may be active or
passive.
In conclusion, the gross negligence standard under the Revised
Uniform Partnership Act may fail to achieve the descriptive, social-
izing, expressive, and remedial objectives of the duty of care. In some
instances, it may fail to achieve an equitable distribution of loss
among partners. Also, it may be an inappropriate standard to govern
LLC managers' conduct given that the LLC provides limited liability
and the potential for passive ownership.
B. The Advantages and Shortcomings of the Corporate
Model
The corporate model of care contained in the Revised Model Busi-
ness Corporation Act contains separate standards of conduct for direc-
tors8 6 and officers. s 7 The corporate scheme sets forth an aspirational
standard of conduct for directors based on the exercise of reasonable
dard of conduct from general partner" because limited partners do not have a
voice in decision-making);
85. Weidner, Midstream, supra note 79, at 852.
86. See REVISED MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 8.30 (2005) providing:
Standards of Conduct for Directors
(a) Each member of the board of directors, when discharging the duties
of a director, shall act: (1) in good faith, and (2) in a manner the director
reasonably believes to be in the best interests of the corporation.
(b) The members of the board of directors or a committee of the board,
when becoming informed in connection with their decision-making func-
tion or devoting attention to their oversight function, shall discharge
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care. However, liability for damages is imposed only in one of five
types of circumstances where the director: 1) was not acting in good
faith; 2) did not believe the conduct was in the best interests of the
company; 3) was not reasonably informed; 4) engaged in a self-inter-
ested transaction, received an improper benefit, or otherwise dealt un-
fairly with the company or shareholders; or 5) engaged in conduct that
involved a sustained attention to the oversight of the business or af-
fairs.8 8 Under the business judgment rule, the standard of judicial
review presumes that absent self-dealing, if there has been a minimal
level of care, the court will not second-guess the decision in question.8 9
Thus, it may be argued that this corporate approach better serves
the descriptive function of the duty of care than the Revised Uniform
Partnership Act formulation because the standard of care is preserved
as a positive standard to which directors may aspire. Professor Coffee
has long regarded the duty of care as a normative standard with an
important "educational and socializing effect." 90 It may be argued
that the dual formulation that separates out the standard of care from
the standard of liability furthers the overall objective of business en-
tity governance to control costs by imposing liability only in grave cir-
cumstances. The dual formulation also arguably serves the remedial
objective of the duty of care by leaving open the possibility of seeking
their duties with the care that a person in a like position would reasona-
bly believe appropriate under similar circumstances.
87. See id. § 8.42 (2005) providing in part:
Standards of Conduct for Officers
(a) An officer, when performing in such capacity, has the duty to act:
(1) in good faith;
(2) with the care that a person in a like position would reasonably
exercise under similar circumstances; and
(3) in a manner the officer reasonably believes to be in the best in-
terests of the corporation.
88. See Miller & Rutledge, supra note 7, at 345 (tracing the evolution of the business
judgment rule from the corporate to non-corporate contexts).
89. See id.; REVISED MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 2.02(b)(4)-(5) (2002) providing:
(b) The articles of incorporation may set forth:
(4) a provision eliminating or limiting the liability of a director to
the corporation or its shareholders for money damages for any ac-
tion taken, or any failure to take any action, as a director, except
liability for (A) the amount of a financial benefit received by a direc-
tor to which he is not entitled; (B) an intentional infliction of harm
on the corporation or the shareholders; (C) a violation of section
8.33; or (D) an intentional violation of criminal law; and
(5) a provision permitting or making obligatory indemnification of a
director for liability (as defined in section 8.50(5)) to any person for
any action taken, or any failure to take any action, as a director,
except liability for (A) receipt of a financial benefit to which he is not
entitled, (B) an intentional infliction of harm on the corporation or
its shareholders, (C) a violation of section 8.33 or (D) an intentional
violation of criminal law.
90. Coffee, supra note 44, at 796.
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equitable relief as distinguished from money damages for lesser of-
fenses than those that would justify a damage award.
Finally, it may be argued that the corporate model retains its roots
in agency law. The Revised Model Business Corporation Act adopts a
separate standard of conduct for officers based on the conduct ex-
pected of a paid agent and requires the exercise of reasonable care.9 1
There is a controversy, however, over whether officers are and should
be subject to a business judgment rule and whether they should be
subject to damages for failing to exercise reasonable care. 9 2 It must be
remembered that LLC managers may exercise both officer-like func-
tions as well as discretionary board-like responsibilities. The LLC
standard of conduct for LLC managers should be equipped to address
conduct in the routine operation of business as well as conduct that
entails broad policy-making decisions regarding extraordinary
transactions. 93
91. See REVISED MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 8.42 (2005) requiring an officer to act in
good faith, with the care that a person in a like position would reasonably exer-
cise under similar circumstances, and in a manner the officer reasonably believes
to be in the best interest of the corporation. The comments to section 8.42 indi-
cate that the standards of conduct are generally based on the principles of
agency.
92. See Lyman P.Q. Johnson, Corporate Officers and the Business Judgment Rule, 60
Bus. LAW. 439, 440 (2005) [hereinafter Johnson, Corporate Officers] (arguing that
the business judgment rule should not be extended to officers in the same broad
manner as to Board members because unlike directors, the risk/reward ratio is
not as high as for directors, officers' duties may consist of executing rather than
making business decisions and for such execution, an ordinary care standard is
appropriate and judicial deference is not needed, and that a due care standard
gives directors leverage over officers to ensure that they discharge duties with
care). See also A. Gilchrist Sparks, III & Lawrence A. Hamermesh, Common Law
Duties of Non-Director Corporate Officers, 48 Bus. LAW. 215, 236 (1992) (observ-
ing that officers' liability under the duty of care is usually greater for officers
than directors, largely because of officers' increased familiarity with the corpora-
tion and recommending that officers be able to utilize the business judgment
rule). Cf Lawrence A. Hamermesh & A. Gilchrist Sparks III, Corporate Officers
and the Business Judgment Rule: A Reply to Professor Johnson, 60 Bus. LAW.
865, 870-75 (2005) (arguing that officers and directors are sometimes the same
and it is difficult to sort out when conduct occurs in the capacity as an officer as
distinguished from a director, and that a due care standard will make officers
more cautious such that they will seek second and third opinions and incur un-
necessary costs).
93. An early draft of the Revised Uniform Limited Liability Company Act attempted
to formulate a separate standard of conduct for non-discretionary operational
conduct and for discretionary conduct but ultimately this approach was found to
be difficult and was abandoned. The proposal provided:
A member's duty of care to a member-managed limited liability company
in the conduct of and winding up of the limited liability company's busi-
ness is limited:
(1) when exercising discretionary authority in making decisions to take
or not to take action, to acting:
(i) independently;
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The business judgment rule shelters corporate directors from judi-
cial scrutiny for business decisions in certain cases in which the direc-
tor did not engage in self-dealing and makes an informed decision. 94
The corporate model arguably establishes personal liability only in ex-
treme cases as the result of the business judgment rule and corporate
indemnification provisions. Critics may argue that the business judg-
ment rule provides too great of a shield from director liability. In Del-
aware, for example, the business judgment rule is applied as a
presumption, thus affecting the burden of proof.95 According to the
Delaware Supreme Court, in Aronson v. Lewis,96
The business judgment rule is an acknowledgment of the managerial preroga-
tives of Delaware directors .... It is a presumption that in making a business
decision the directors of a corporation acted on an informed basis, in good
faith, and in the honest belief that the action taken was in the best interests of
the company . . . Absent an abuse of discretion, that judgment will be
respected by the courts. The burden is on the party challenging the decision
to establish facts rebutting the presumption.
9 7
The ability to rebut the presumption of the business judgment rule
remains an uphill battle-the plaintiff must prove gross negligence
and to ultimately prevail, establish causation and damages and over-
come the director's possible defense that the challenged transaction
was fair.98 The scope of protection under the approach taken by the
American Legal Institute is even wider, extending director or officer
protection where the decision-maker makes a business judgment in
good faith and: 1) is not interested in the subject; 2) is informed to the
extent he or she believes is appropriate in the circumstances; and 3)
rationally believes the judgment is in the best interests of the corpora-
tion.99 Some jurisdictions have lowered the standard of care even fur-
(ii) in a manner the member reasonably believes to be in the best
interest of the limited liability company; and
(iii) after considering information the member reasonably believes
appropriate in the circumstances, including information provided by
another person that the member reasonably believes is a competent
and reliable source for the information; and
(2) in all other circumstances, to acting with the care that a person in a
like position would reasonably exercise under similar circumstances.
See National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws ULLCA
Drafting Committee, Alternative to Sections 110, 209, and 410 of the 2004 Annual
Meeting Draft, June 16, 2004, at 7-8, available at http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll
archives/ulcdullca/ullca-alternatives_061804-1.pdf.
94. Miller & Rutledge, supra note 7, at 351-52 (analyzing the business judgment rule
in corporate and unincorporated entities).
95. Id. at 348.
96. 473 A.2d 805 (Del. 1984).
97. See id. at 812.
98. See id. at 813; see also Miller & Rutledge, supra note 7, at 353 (discussing the
showing required by the plaintiff to overcome the business judgment rule).
99. See PRINCIPLES, supra note 43, § 4.03(c).
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ther by providing that liability will be imposed only in the event of
willful misconduct or recklessness.100
Even if liability is imposed, indemnification statutes provide a sec-
ond tier of insulation from personal liability. Following Smith v. Van
Gorkom,1o1 the Delaware Supreme Court decision in which directors
were held liable where they were deemed not sufficiently informed
about the true value of a company before approving a merger, legisla-
tures across the country followed Delaware's lead by adopting legisla-
tion that eliminates or limits the personal liability of a director to the
corporation or its stockholders for monetary damages for negli-
gence.1 0 2 The Principals of Corporate Governance, published by the
American Law Institute, report that since 1985 over thirty states have
adopted legislation reducing or eliminating exposure to personal lia-
bility for monetary damages for duty of care violations. 1o3 The indem-
nification provisions vary in the degree of protection afforded.l04 The
approach taken by the American Law Institute is to permit indemnifi-
cation except for knowing violations of law, or for certain fines, penal-
ties, judgments or settlements where the policy would preclude
indemnification.1OS The Revised Model Business Corporation Act per-
mits indemnification where the director's conduct was in good faith,
and where the director believed the conduct to be in the best interests
100. See, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 23-1-35-1(e) (LexisNexis 1999) and associated com-
mentary (indicating subsection (e)'s standard is different from the "gross negli-
gence" standard and "willful misconduct" or "recklessness" require, at minimum,
a conscious disregard of or indifference to the consequences of a risky act such as
in Orkin Exterminating Co. v. Trainer, 486 N.E.2d 1019, 1023 (Ind. Ct. App.
1932) and that gross negligence involves more than ordinary inadvertence, but
less than such conscious disregard or indifference according to WILLIAM L. PROS-
SER & W. PAGE KEETON, THE LAW OF TORTS 212 (5th ed. 1984)).
101. 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1984).
102. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (2001). Delaware permits such indemnifi-
cation agreements, except that such provisions may not "eliminate or limit the
liability of a director: (i) For any breach of the director's duty of loyalty to the
corporation or its stockholders; (ii) for acts or omissions not in good faith or which
involve intentional misconduct or a knowing violation of law; (iii) under § 174 of
this title; or (iv) for any transaction from which the director derived an improper
personal benefit." Id.; Charles M. Elson & Robert B. Thompson, Van Gorkom's
Legacy: The Limits of Judicially Enforced Constraints and the Promise of Proprie-
tary Incentives, 96 Nw. U. L. REV. 579, 582-83 (2002) (discussing Van Gorkom
and the role of markets, private ordering, the law, and norms on constraining
board conduct); see also Donald C. Langevoort, The Human Nature of Corporate
Boards: Laws, Norms and Unintended Consequences of Independence and Ac-
countability, 89 GEO. L.J. 797, 800 (2000) (discussing the prominent influence of
extralegal social forces in shaping board behavior). See generally Symposium,
Norms & Corporate Law, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1607 (2001) (discussing the role of
norms and that of corporate law).
103. See PRINCIPLES, supra note 43, at pt. IV, introductory note, (b).
104. See PRINCIPLES, supra note 43, at pt. IV, ch. 3, § 7.20 n.6.
105. See PRINCIPLES, supra note 43, § 7.20(b)-(c).
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of the corporation, or at least not opposed to its best interests, and
where in a criminal context the director had no reasonable cause to
believe the conduct was unlawful.10 6
In Delaware, only inexcusable inattentiveness and/or a complete
abdication of one's duties to oversee the business have triggered judg-
ments for plaintiffs.lo7 Thus, in In re Caremark International Inc., 10 8
where officers were indicted for receiving kickbacks for referrals of
medical supplies and equipment, the Delaware Court refused to im-
pose liability upon the directors where the court believed that they
had in good faith regarded the corporation's information and reporting
system as adequate.l0 9 A sustained or systematic failure of the board
to exercise oversight such as an utter failure to attempt to assure a
reasonable information and reporting system exists would constitute a
lack of good faith necessary to justify the imposition of liability. 110
Only egregious conduct will nullify Delaware's indemnification provi-
sions permitting the corporation to indemnify persons who acted in
good faith and in a manner reasonably believed to be in the best inter-
ests of the company."' According to In re Walt Disney, 112 indemnifi-
106. See REVISED MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 8.51 (2002).
107. See Francis v. United Jersey Bank, 432 A.2d 805, 814 (Del. 1981) (involving direc-
tors who were held liable for negligence in failing to prevent other directors from
embezzling funds where the widow of the former CFO had inherited half of the
corporate stock and failed to attend board meetings, read financial statements, or
learn about the business thus enabling her son to steal money from the com-
pany); PRINCIPLES, supra note 43, § 4.01 (discussing the prerequisite of a con-
scious exercise of judgment to gain protection of the business judgment rule); see
also Graham v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg., 188 A.2d 125-30 (Del. 1963) (failing to hold
defendants liable but observing that liability could result if directors had reck-
lessly trusted untrustworthy employees, neglected cavalierly to perform job du-
ties or willfully or through inattention ignored obvious danger signs).
108. 698 A.2d 959 (Del. Ch. 1996).
109. Id. at 970-71.
110. Id. at 971; see Halpert Enter. v. Harrison, No. 06 Civ. 2331(HB), 2007 WL
486561 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 14, 2007) (dismissing a shareholders' derivative action
against Harrison and other directors, officers, and Board members of J.P. Morgan
Chase & Co. alleging breach of fiduciary duty, gross mismanagement, corporate
waste and securities violations for failing to prevent transactions such as Enron
and WorldCom that cost J.P. Morgan over $4 billion in fines, civil litigation costs,
and settlements); see also Stone v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362 (Del. 2006) (affirming
dismissal of shareholders suit based in part of failure of the oversight function).
111. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (2001) (permitting indemnification agree-
ments, except that such provisions may not "eliminate or limit the liability of a
director: (i) for any breach of the director's duty of loyalty to the corporation or its
stockholders; (ii) for acts or omissions not in good faith or which involve inten-
tional misconduct or a knowing violation of law; (iii) under §174 of this title; or
(iv) for any transaction from which the director derived an improper personal
benefit").
112. 906 A.2d 27 (Del. 2006) (affirming the Chancery Court's ruling in favor of the
defendants where the Disney Board had authorized the payment of $130 million
in severance pay to Orvitz, its CEO, after he had served only fourteen months of a
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cation in Delaware is denied for a lack of good faith only where the
behavior is qualitatively more culpable than gross negligence, where,
for instance, the conduct encompasses an intentional dereliction of
duty or conscious disregard for one's responsibilities.113 For example,
in ATR-Kim Eng Financial Corp. v. Araneta,114 two directors were
jointly liable with the ninety percent owner/director of a corporation,
where the two directors had failed to implement a reporting or moni-
toring system to prevent the transfer of the company's assets to the
majority owner's children. Liability was imposed upon these two di-
rectors because of their intentional abandonment of duties, which was
construed by the court as a breach of their duty of loyalty.115 It may
be argued that Delaware's corporate standard for oversight responsi-
bilities might be too low since only an utter failure to implement any
reporting or information system or controls, or a conscious failure to
monitor or oversee operations appears to amount to a failure to dis-
charge the duty of loyalty in good faith.116
Clearly, the corporate model provides mixed messages-on one
hand it sets an aspirational standard of reasonable care for directors
and officers, yet by virtue of the business judgment rule and liberal
indemnification provisions, imposes personal liability on directors for
business decisions only in rare cases of extreme wrongdoing. Stan-
dards of conduct should inspire and reflect responsible behavior with-
out unduly chilling risk-taking behavior.1l 7 Clearly, while internal
five-year term); see also In re Walt Disney Co., 907 A.2d 693 (Del. Ch. Aug. 9,
2005) (holding that directors did not act in bad faith and were at most ordinarily
negligent in connection with the hiring and firing of the company's CEO).
113. See Disney, 906 A.2d at 27.
114. No. CIV.A. 489-N, 2006 WL 3783520 (Del. Ch. Dec. 21, 2006), affd, No. 60, 2007
WL 1704647 (Del. June 13, 2007).
115. Id. at *21.
116. See Stone v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 370-71 (Del. 2006) (involving a suit growing
out of a money laundering scheme and a bank's failure to file Suspicious Activity
Reports in violation of the Bank Secrecy Act where the Delaware Supreme Court
affirmed the dismissal of a derivative complaint alleging the directors failed to
properly exercise its oversight role).
117. See In re Caremark Int'l Inc., 698 A.2d 959, 968-69 n.16 (Del. Ch. 1996).
The vocabulary of negligence while often employed is not well-suited to
judicial review of board inattentiveness, especially if one attempts to
look to the substance of the decision as any evidence of possible "negli-
gence." Where review of board functioning is involved, the courts leave
behind as a relevant point of reference the decisions of the hypothetical
"reasonable person" who typically supplies the test for negligence liabil-
ity. It is doubtful that we want business men and women to be en-
couraged to make decisions as hypothetical persons of ordinary
judgment and prudence might. The corporate form gets its utility in
large part from its ability to allow diversified investors to accept greater
investment risk. If those in charge of the corporation are to be adjudged
personally liable for losses on the basis of a substantive judgment based
on what an ordinary or average judgment and average risk assessment
talent regard as "prudent" "sensible" or even "rational", such persons
2008]
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
firm mechanisms should be the first line of defense against poor man-
agement, at some point legal intervention may become necessary
before conduct degenerates to the point that the director has com-
pletely abandoned duties, particularly if management is entrenched in
a private entity. Ultimately, too much judicial deference can erode in-
vestor confidence in the legal scheme of business entity governance."l 8
Three major points of clarification may be helpful to ensure that
the corporate model does not result in too little or too much judicial
intervention in the LLC context. First, it may be helpful for courts in
LLC cases to clarify that the business judgment rule only applies
when business decision-making is involved but does not excuse non-
performance of duties. Second, courts should recognize that if the
statutory formulation already states that the duty of care is to refrain
from grossly negligent conduct, the standard of care articulated as
gross negligence already factors in judicial deference to business deci-
sion-making.119 Further judicial deference might result in too relaxed
a standard.120 Third, it may be helpful for courts to clarify that mis-
behavior more serious than ordinary inadvertence is necessary to trig-
ger judicial intervention; however, the level of misbehavior necessary
to permit legal or equitable remedies need not be so egregious as to
amount to intentional and/or a complete and utter abandonment of
duties.
Ultimately, a balanced approach to the duty of care is recom-
mended that would prevent excessive judicial intervention but ensure
rigorous judicial remedies for conduct that is below ordinary inadver-
tence. The business judgment rule should not excuse the duty to mon-
itor and actively assume responsibilities. 12 1 The driver asleep at the
wheel, the officer who totally neglects the books, or the director who
fails to oversee the business are not exercising business judgment.
The level of negligence that should justify judicial intervention should
probably be something that need not amount to intentional miscon-
duct that is so grave as to become tantamount to bad faith or a breach
in the duty of loyalty. Nevertheless, the misconduct should be more
will have a strong incentive at the margin to authorize less risky invest-
ment projects.
Id. (citations omitted).
118. See Edward Rock & Michael Wachter, Dangerous Liaisons: Corporate Law, Trust
Law, and Interdoctrinal Legal Transplants, 96 Nw. U. L. REV. 651, 664-65 (2002)
(explaining judicial deference in corporate law as the expression of discomfort
with applying the trustee/agency law duty of care to directors because the rela-
tionship between the corporation and director is an internal relationship gov-
erned largely by the firm, whereas the relationship between the settler or
beneficiary and the trustee is an external relationship governed by the so-called
market).
119. See Miller & Rutledge, supra note 7, at 362-63.
120. Id.
121. See PRINCIPLES, supra note 43, § 4.01.
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serious than instances of carelessness and/or moderate degrees of poor
performance.
As discussed in Part IV.D, some courts in the LLC context have
already implicitly recognized that the business judgment rule plays no
role in excusing non-performance. While not always thoroughly artic-
ulating their rationale, some decisions appear to be striking a bal-
anced approach to judicial monitoring. Ultimately, after discussing
the LLC statutory and judicial environment in Part IV below, Part V
recommends a slight tailoring of the corporate model of care for use in
the LLC. It suggests a separate articulation of the duty of care rooted
in agency concepts-a duty to act with the care that a person in a like
position would reasonably exercise under similar circumstances. It
then suggests a careful application of the business judgment rule so
that the business judgment rule does not overwhelm and negate the
overall standard to act reasonably when the actor is discharging oper-
ational or oversight responsibilities. The Revised Uniform Limited Li-
ability Company Act is consistent with these recommendations but
does not offer statutory guidelines on the business judgment rule. 122
IV. STATUTES, INDEMNIFICATION, & LLC CASE LAW
Most state LLC statutes include statutory provisions concerning
the duty of care. 12 3 Only a few states follow the Delaware approach
and permit fiduciary duties to be eliminated.124 While LLCs are still
in their infancy, judicial interpretations are beginning to emerge. The
case law provides a window into the increasingly important economic
role played by LLCs in industries involving oil and gas, energy and
real estate, and the provision of quasi-governmental services. While
122. See REVISED UNIF. LTD. LiAB. Co. ACT § 409 (2006).
123. See infra apps. B & C.
124. Only a few states permit the elimination of duties (i.e. Arkansas, District of Co-
lumbia, Georgia, and Kentucky). See ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-32-404 (2007) (permit-
ting the elimination of fiduciary duties); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 7-80-108(1.5)
(2006) (providing the duties of such member, manager, or other person may be
restricted or eliminated by provisions in the operating agreement, as long as any
such provision is not manifestly unreasonable); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-
1101(c) (2005) (permitting duties to be expanded, restricted, or eliminated); D.C.
CODE ANN. § 29-1020 (LexisNexis 2007) (indicating that liability "may be limited
or eliminated in the articles of organization" except for willful misconduct); GA.
CODE ANN. § 14-11-305(4)(A) (2003) (providing that the "member's or manager's
duties and liabilities may be expanded, restricted, or eliminated by provisions in
the articles of organization or a written operating agreement" but not for "inten-
tional misconduct or a knowing violation of law" or "for any transactions for
which the person received a personal benefit in violation or breach of any provi-
sion of a written operating agreement"); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 53-624 (2000) (pro-
viding for the elimination of duties without apparent restriction); Ky. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 275.180 (West 2006) (providing that the operating agreement may elimi-
nate or limit personal liability for monetary damages for a breach of any duty).
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the vast majority of fiduciary duty litigation pertains to violations of
the duty of loyalty, duty of care cases are beginning to emerge and
courts are recognizing the LLC manager's duty to act and to actively
assume managerial duties. Whether supervising bookkeeping and
banking functions, 12 5 performing due diligence procedures, 12 6 or ob-
taining licenses for the LLC's operations, 12 7 the LLC manager is ex-
pected to actively discharge responsibilities. Case law further
suggests that a corporate director may not circumvent fiduciary duties
by forming an LLC and purporting to discharge business operations
through the LLC.128
A. A Range of Standards
The statutory LLC duty of care provisions include: 1) ordinary
care, good faith business judgment of the best interests of the com-
pany, or prudent person language;129 2) the requirement to refrain
from gross negligence or willful misconduct;130 3) the requirement to
refrain from recklessness;1 3 1 and 4) statutory silence on the duty of
care with case law precedents based on due care or on the duty to
refrain from grossly negligent conduct.13 2
B. Contractual Definition
Most LLC statutes may be described as enabling statutes that pre-
suppose that the major issues concerning LLC operations and govern-
ance matters will be determined by the LLC operating agreement.
Many statutes contain express standards with regard to fiduciary du-
125. See Shell v. King, No. E2003-02124-COA-R3-CV, 2004 WL 1749186 (Tenn. Ct.
App. Aug. 5, 2004).
126. Johnson v. Songwriter Collective, LLC, No. 3:05-0320, 2006 WL 861490 (M.D.
Tenn. Mar. 28, 2006).
127. Healthcare Mgmt. & Inv. Holdings v. Feldman, Nos. 1:03CV0323, 1:04CV0883,
2006 WL 2660628 (N.D. Ohio Sept. 15, 2006).
128. Barbieri v. Swing-N-Slide Corp., No. 14239, 1997 WL 55956 (Del. Ch. Jan. 29,
1997).
129. See infra app. B; 2 CARTER G. BISHOP & DANIEL S. KLEINBERGER, LIMITED LIABIL-
ITY COMPANIES: TAX AND BUSINESS LAw § 10.02 (2006) (providing an overview of
duty of care provisions); see also Miller & Rutledge, supra note 7, at 365-66 (dis-
cussing the statutory environment of the duty of care in the context of the LLC).
130. See infra app. C.
131. See IND. CODE ANN. § 23-1-35-1(e) (LexisNexis 1999) (providing that a director is
not liable unless he has breached or failed to perform his duties and the failure
constitutes willful or reckless conduct); 2 BIsHoP & KLEINBERGER, supra note 129,
§ 10.02[1] [dl.
132. For example, Delaware's LLC statute lacks a statutory standard of care and the
Maryland LLC statute lacks a statutory statement of care except with regard to
the provision of professional services. See MD. CODE ANN., CORPS. & ASS'NS § 4A-
301.1 (LexisNexis 1999).
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ties and then provide limitations on the extent to which these duties
may be modified or eliminated by the LLC agreement.
Delaware has taken the lead in providing contractual freedom with
regard to the definition of fiduciary duties. The Delaware LLC statute
is silent with respect to required fiduciary duties. The duty of loyalty
has been judicially imposed in the LLC context largely through the
requirement that self-interested transactions be shown to be funda-
mentally fair.13 3 The duty of care is regarded as less exacting than
that based on simple negligence. 134 Initially, the Delaware LLC stat-
ute provided that the member's or manager's duties and liabilities
may be expanded or restricted by provisions in the LLC agreement.13 5
However, the LLC statute was modified following the Delaware Su-
preme Court decision in Gotham Partners v. Hallwood Realty Part-
ners13 6 in which the Court admonished the legal community that
scrupulous adherence to fiduciary duties is normally expected and
that the statute did not permit the contractual elimination of fiduciary
duties. 13 7 The Delaware LLC statute now provides that duties may
be expanded, restricted, or eliminated by the LLC agreement, pro-
vided that the agreement may not eliminate the contractual covenant
of good faith and fair dealing.13s Similarly, the Kentucky LLC statute
permits the agreement to eliminate or limit personal liability for mon-
etary damages. 139 However, the Kentucky provision does not contain
Delaware's caveat prohibiting the elimination of the contractual cove-
nant of good faith and fair dealing. 140 It remains to be seen whether
Delaware's prohibition on the elimination of the duty of good faith will
operate in practice as a significant constraint on managerial conduct
in the LLC. 141 While there is some authority for interpreting the cov-
133. Solar Cells, Inc. v. True North Partners, LLC, No. Civ.A. 19477, 2002 WL 749163
(Del. Ch. Apr. 25, 2002) (enjoining a clandestine attempt to merge an LLC into
the defendant's wholly-owned subsidiary); see VGS, Inc. v. Castiel, No. C.A.
17995, 2000 WL 1277372 (Del. Ch. Aug. 31, 2000) (challenging a merger where
the plaintiff received inadequate notice which would have substantially reduced
the plaintiffs control of the LLC).
134. Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 813 n.6 (Del. 1984) (challenging loans and an
employment agreement that benefited a 47% shareholder and indicating that the
defendants were protected by the business judgment rule where plaintiffs failed
to show that defendants were self-interested, lacked independence, or acted con-
trary to the best interests of the corporation).
135. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-1101(b)-(c) (1999).
136. 817 A.2d 160, 167-68 (Del. 2002).
137. Id. at 168 (dictum).
138. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-1101(a)-(c) (2005).
139. Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 275.180 (West 2006).
140. Id.
141. See generally Paul M. Altman & Srinivas M. Raju, Delaware Alternative Entities
and the Implied Contractual Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing Under
Delaware Law, 60 Bus. LAw 1469 (2005) (providing an overview of the contrac-
tual covenant of good faith).
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enant narrowly, 142 the covenant of good faith could be used to combat
a variety of furtive conduct in instances where fiduciary duties have
been waived.14 3
The more common approach is to permit personal liability to be
eliminated or limited in the LLC operating agreement but to place sig-
nificant restrictions on fiduciary duty waivers or contractual indemni-
fication provisions.14 4 Minnesota is a case in point. The Minnesota
LLC statute permits the articles or agreement to eliminate or limit
the liability of the LLC governor.14 5 However, liability may not be
eliminated or limited for breaches of the duty of loyalty, acts or omis-
sions not in good faith, or for conduct involving intentional misconduct
or knowing violations of law, violations of laws governing the sale of
securities, illegal distributions, or for transactions from which the gov-
ernor receives an improper personal benefit.146 Thus, while the LLC
agreement may not limit liability for duty of loyalty violations, it may
protect the manager from liability for acts or omissions that do not
rise to the level of intentional misconduct or to the knowing violation
of law.
Even liberal jurisdictions such as Florida and Georgia place re-
strictions on contractual waivers. In Florida, the LLC operating
agreement may not eliminate the duty of loyalty although it may iden-
tify types or categories of activities that do not violate the duty of loy-
alty if not manifestly unreasonable. 147 Also, the agreement may not
unreasonably reduce the duty of care. 148
In Georgia, the member's or manager's duties may be contractually
expanded, restricted, or eliminated by the articles of organization or
the operating agreement. However, there can be no elimination or
limitation upon liability arising from intentional misconduct, knowing
142. See Cincinnati SMSA Ltd. P'ship v. Cincinnati Bell Cellular Sys. Co., 708 A.2d
989, 992 (Del. 1998) (observing that the interpretation of the implied covenant of
good faith is a cautious enterprise).
143. See Daniel S. Kleinberger, Careful What You Wish For-Freedom of Contract and
the Necessity of Careful Scrivening (William Mitchell Coll. of Law, Legal Studies
Research Series, Working Paper No. 52, Oct. 26, 2006), available at http://ssrn.
com/abstract=939009; Mark J. Lowenstein, Fiduciary Duties and Unincorporated
Business Entities: In Defense of the "Manifestly Unreasonable" Standard (Univer-
sity of Colorado Law Sch., Legal Studies Research Series, Working Paper No. 06-
06, Mar. 2006), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=893213.
144. See infra app. A.
145. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 322B.663(4) (West Supp. 2008).
146. Liability may not be eliminated or limited for acts or omissions occurring before
the date when the articles or agreement containing the limiting provisions were
in effect. See id. at §§ 322B.663(4)(1)-(5).
147. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 608.423(2)(b) (West 2007).
148. Id. § 608.423(2)(c).
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violations of law, or for transactions for which a personal benefit was
received in violation of the written operating agreement. 14 9
The first Uniform Limited Liability Company Act prohibited the
contractual elimination of the duty of loyalty, the unreasonable re-
striction of information rights, and the unreasonable reduction of the
duty of care.150 It permitted the parties to identify specific categories
of activities that did not violate the duty of loyalty if not manifestly
unreasonable.15 The Revised Uniform Limited Liability Company
Act goes further and permits the operating agreement to eliminate the
duty to account and the duty to refrain from competition if not mani-
festly unreasonable. 15 2 The revised statute permits the agreement to
alter any other fiduciary duty including eliminating particular aspects
of that duty.153 Also, it permits the agreement to alter the duty of
care except for intentional or knowing violations of law.1 54 As more
fully discussed in Part V, to further the socializing and remedial objec-
tives of the duty of care, limitations are strongly recommended to pre-
vent the complete elimination of fiduciary duties.
C. Indemnification Restrictions
Most LLC statutes permit the LLC agreement to provide indemni-
fication to a manager or member for liability arising out of LLC litiga-
tion, but place restrictions on the circumstances in which the
indemnification may be made.155
A number of states prohibit indemnification unless there was a
good faith reasonable belief that the conduct in question was in the
149. GA. CODE ANN. § 14-11-305(4)(A) (West 2003).
150. UNIF. LTD. LisA. Co. ACT § 103(b) (1996).
151. Id. § 103(b)(2).
152. REVISED UNIF. LTD. LiAB. Co. ACT § 110(d)(1) (2006) providing:
(d) If not manifestly unreasonable, the operating agreement may:
(1) restrict or eliminate the duty:
(A) as required in Section 409(b)(1) and (g), to account to the
limited liability company and to hold as trustee for it any prop-
erty, profit, or benefit derived by the member in the conduct or
winding up of the company's business, from a use by the mem-
ber of the company's property, or from the appropriation of a
limited liability company opportunity;
(B) as required in Section 409(b)(2) and (g), to refrain from com-
peting with the company in the conduct or winding up of the
company's business before as or on behalf of a party having an
interest adverse to the company; and
(C) as required by Section 409(b)(3) and (g), to refrain from com-
peting with the company in the conduct of the company's busi-
ness before the dissolution of the company.
153. Id. § 110(d)(4).
154. Id. § 110(d)(3).
155. See infra apps. D & E including selected states that restrict the circumstances in
which indemnification may be provided.
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best interests of the LLC or was not opposed to its best interests. 156
Others additionally stipulate that the individual must not have re-
ceived an improper personal benefit.15 7 Another typical condition is
that in the case of a criminal proceeding, the person had no reasonable
cause to believe that the conduct was unlawful.158 Some states re-
quire that the person not have engaged in willful misconduct or a
knowing violation of law. 159
Many states prohibit the LLC agreement from indemnifying an in-
dividual where defined types of misconduct have occurred.16 0 For ex-
ample, Colorado permits indemnification if there has not been a
violation of duties owed to the LLC.161 Alabama prohibits indemnifi-
cation if there has been negligence or misconduct in the performance
of duties.162 A more common provision is for the statute to prohibit
indemnification if there has been willful misconduct or reckless-
ness. 163 Other prohibitions include the receipt of improper distribu-
tions,164 improper financial benefits, services, or involve the failure to
perform duties. 165
Delaware and a handful of other states fail to place statutory re-
strictions on indemnification provisions.16 6 Although Delaware's cor-
porate indemnification provision prohibits corporations from
indemnifying a director for conduct not in "good faith,"167 the Dela-
ware LLC statute permits indemnification with respect to all claims
and demands whatsoever.168
156. See infra app. D including selected states requiring a good faith and reasonable
belief that the conduct was in the LLC's best interests or not opposed to its best
interests.
157. See infra app. E.
158. See infra app. E.
159. See VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-1025 (West 1999).
160. See infra app. E citing states in which various restrictions are placed on
indemnification.
161. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 7-80-407 (2007).
162. ALA. CODE § 10-12-4(n) (LexisNexis 1999).
163. See infra app. E including citations to provisions in Washington D.C., Montana,
Maryland, and Pennsylvania.
164. See infra app. E; MICH. Comp. LAws ANN. § 450.4407-08 (West 2002); OKLA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 2017 (West 1999); OR. REV. STAT. § 63.160 (2003).
165. See WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 25.15.040 (West 2006).
166. See infra app. F including Arizona, Arkansas, Connecticut, Idaho, Kansas, Ken-
tucky, New Jersey, and New Mexico.
167. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 145(a) (2001) (granting power to indemnify "if the
person acted in good faith and in a manner the person reasonably believed to be
in or not opposed to the best interests of the corporation, and, with regard to any
criminal action or proceeding had no reasonable cause to believe the conduct was
unlawful").
168. Compare DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (2001) (providing that a corporation
may eliminate or limit the personal liability of a director to the corporation or its
stockholders for monetary damages but shall not eliminate or limit liability for
any breach of the duty of loyalty, acts or omissions not in good faith or which
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As more fully discussed below, statutory restrictions on indemnifi-
cation provisions are recommended. It is argued that LLC managers
should not be able to evade the consequences of serious violations of
the duty of care. As explained long ago by Joseph Bishop, Jr.:
[Wihere civil liability is the sole or principal deterrent to self-enrichment at
the corporation's expense, the director should not be permitted to insure him-
self against such liability .... For like reasons, directors should not be able to
insure themselves against liability based on negligence of a gross description,
amounting to a total abdication of the responsibility imposed upon them by
law. 1 6 9
As discussed below, Bishop's rationale applies with equal force in the
LLC context.
D. LLC Duty of Care Case Law and Standards of Conduct
While the overwhelming majority of cases involve allegations of a
breach of the duty of loyalty, LLC cases involving allegations of breach
of the duty of care have begun to surface. Three major themes are
emerging from the case law. First, the case law that involves the fur-
nishing of critical infrastructure services or other special services
highlights the important nature of the economic activities undertaken
by some LLCs. It is particularly in these infrastructure cases that a
standard articulated as simply a duty to refrain from grossly negligent
conduct or reckless conduct seems out of place. Second, the cases re-
viewed involving monitoring and/or oversight responsibilities suggest
that courts seem to be taking a balanced approach, although the deci-
sions could have been improved by a more thorough explanation of
their rationales. Nevertheless, the courts in the LLC cases considered
below are not intervening when merely moderately careless or moder-
ately negligent conduct is involved, yet are not requiring a total and
complete abandonment of duties virtually amounting to bad faith or
intentional misconduct in order to trigger judicial action. 170 The third
important point that may be gleaned from the cases is that it may be
involve intentional misconduct or a knowing violation of law, certain violations
under 174 and for transactions from which the director derived an improper per-
sonal benefit) with DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-108 (2005) (providing that subject
to standards and restrictions if any in the operating agreement, a limited liability
company may indemnify any member or manager or other person from and
against any and all claims and demands whatsoever).
169. Joseph W. Bishop, Jr., Sitting Ducks and Decoy Ducks: New Trends in the Indem-
nification of Corporate Directors and Officers, 77 YALE L.J. 1078, 1092 (1968) (dis-
cussing the wisdom of using outside directors and limiting indemnification for
serious violations of duties).
170. Cf ATR-Kim Eng Fin. Corp. v. Araneta, No. CIV.A. 489-N, 2006 WL 3783520
(Del. Ch. Dec. 21, 2006) (imposing liability for a breach in the duty of loyalty
where two of the directors intentionally abandoned their oversight duties which
was thought to be an utter failure to monitor that amounted to a failure to dis-
charge the duty of loyalty in good faith).
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helpful to have coherence in standards of conduct across business enti-
ties. One of the cases reviewed below involves the use of an LLC to
circumvent corporate fiduciary duties. This case underscores the im-
portance of preventing the LLC from being used to commit breaches in
the duty of loyalty or care stemming from relationships grounded in
corporations or other non-LLC entity structures.
In terms of the volume of fiduciary duty litigation, the duty of loy-
alty cases seem to predominate and even some of the duty of care
cases are hybrid cases involving allegations of breaches of the duty of
loyalty as well as care. This is consistent with the pattern that was
observed long ago in the corporate arena when the pure duty of care
cases untouched by concomitant breaches in the duty of loyalty were
described as "the proverbial shaving of pigs-much squeal and little
Wool."171
1. The Infrastructure Cases
The public interest in responsible LLC management becomes evi-
dent when one considers the explosive growth of the LLC. As dis-
cussed in Part II.A., LLCs now rank among publicly traded business
entities and can be seen in a wide range of industries including oil and
gas, energy and distribution, and real estate.172 LLC case law
additionally underscores the range and relative importance of the
economic role played by the LLC. Foster-Thompson, LLC v. Thomp-
son,173 Cement-Lock v. Gas Technology Institute,174 and Willoughby
Rehabilitation & Health Care Center, LLC v. Webster17 5 remind us
that critical quasi-governmental services may be housed in the LLC
and that LLC business activities can potentially affect the environ-
ment, public health, and/or public safety.
Foster-Thompson, LLC was a Florida LLC created for the purpose
of constructing electrical power generating facilities in Iraq. 176 The
LLC was awarded a $24 million contract by the United States through
the Coalition Provisional Authority. The defendant was the manager
and engineering supervisor. The suit was instituted by the LLC
against the defendant manager who allegedly sold and brokered the
sale of power generating equipment and components to others on his
own personal behalf, used LLC funds for non-business related activi-
ties, made and received kickbacks, and failed to properly supervise the
171. Bishop, supra note 169, at 1095.
172. See Coalition of Publicly Traded Partnerships, Currently Traded PTPs, http:l!
www.naptp.orgIPTPlO1CurrentPTPs.htm (last visited Apr. 7, 2008).
173. No. 8:04-CV-2128T30EAJ, 2005 WL 3093510 (M.D. Fla. Nov. 18, 2005).
174. No. 05 C 0018, 2005 WL 2420374 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 30, 2005).
175. Willoughby Rehab. & Health Care Ctr., LLC v. Webster, No. 12431-04, 2006 WL
3068961 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Oct. 26, 2006) (involving nursing home care).
176. Foster-Thompson, 2005 WL 3093510 at *1.
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project. The Court failed to grant the defendant's motions for sum-
mary judgment and observed that Florida's LLC statute creates a
duty of care as well as a duty of loyalty.177
In Cement-Lock, a suit was brought against a group of entities in-
cluding Endesco Clean Harbors, LLC.178 The case arose out of the
mishandling of grant money earmarked for the marketing of technol-
ogy that remediates contaminated materials and converts them into a
cement additive. The court held that the plaintiffs had adequately
pleaded a breach of fiduciary duties including the duty of care, loyalty,
and good faith. The allegations ranged from the receipt of kickbacks
to the misappropriation of research grant funds.179
Both Foster-Thompson and Cement-Lock reflect the breadth of ac-
tivities undertaken by LLCs. Whether the LLC provides electrical
power, remediates contaminated materials, constructs public tunnels,
roadways or buildings, or provides nursing care, an improperly man-
aged LLC may adversely affect the public. From the investor's per-
spective, whether the LLC provides utilities that are a critical part of
the society's infrastructure or offers manicure and pedicure services,
expectations of responsible management deserve to be equally
respected. However, where the LLC provides critical services, duty of
care violations may not only disappoint reasonable investor expecta-
tions, but also may result in serious consequences to third parties.
While the primary goal of business entity governance law is to pro-
mote investor confidence and not to regulate business for the protec-
tion of third parties, it is important for business entity governance
standards to generally promote, rather than frustrate, overall policy
goals of achieving responsible management. Cases such as Foster-
Thompson and Cement-Lock involving vital services remind us of the
importance of creating a legal environment that promotes responsible
managerial conduct through both internal governance standards and
legal constraints for the protection of third parties.
A duty of care articulated as a duty to refrain from grossly negli-
gent or reckless conduct seems out of place particularly where the
LLC's services involve key features of society's infrastructure or other
services having a significant impact upon the public. While it is im-
portant to ensure that standards of conduct do not lead to excessive
legal intervention, it is also important, particularly where key services
are involved, to retain the socializing aspects of the law. Also, it may
become important to ensure that equitable remedies will become
available to investors before the LLC manager's conduct degenerates
to a complete abandonment of duties or to reckless or intentional mis-
conduct. Foster-Thompson and Cement-Lock provide examples of the
177. Id. at *4.




type of contexts in which the duty to act reasonably seems most appro-
priate as an internal governance standard.
2. The Duty to Actively Assume Management Duties
As stated previously in the discussion of the corporate model, cor-
porate law recognizes an affirmative duty to actively assume one's
management duties.' 8 0 The business judgment rule insulates direc-
tors from liability for making poor business decisions, but its applica-
tion presupposes attention to one's duties. As explained by the
Principles of Corporate Governance:
There is, however, no reason to provide special protection where no business
decision-making is to be found. If, for example, directors have failed to over-
see the conduct of the corporation's business by not even considering the need
for an effective audit process, and this permits an executive to abscond with
corporate funds, business judgment rule protection would be manifestly unde-
sirable. The same would be true where a director received but did not read
basic financial information, over time, and thus allowed his corporation to be
looted.181
The duty to actively discharge one's responsibilities in LLC man-
agement has been recognized in the LLC context in connection with
oversight responsibilities for the financial records. In Shell v. King, 18 2
the courts applied the corporate-like language of Tennessee's LLC
statute, which requires that a manager discharge duties in good faith
in a manner the manager reasonably believes to be in the best inter-
ests of the LLC and with the care of an ordinarily prudent person
under similar circumstances.1 8 3 The plaintiffs, a husband and wife,
owned a fifty percent interest in an LLC that was engaged in land-
scaping while the defendant owned the remaining fifty percent. The
defendant also owned another landscaping company for which plain-
tiffs installed landscaping designs. Plaintiffs alleged that the LLC
was forced out of business in part because defendant neglected the
company and customers, failed to pay debts in a timely fashion, falsely
claimed a capital account far greater than its actual value, and
charged inflated amounts for salary expenses payable to the business
garden center which defendant owned. Most importantly, the trial
court found that the defendant had failed to properly review and check
the work of the bookkeeper to ensure that amounts were properly de-
posited in the bank. Eventually a large sum was stolen by the book-
keeper who was ultimately charged with embezzlement.18 4
180. See Francis v. United Jersey Bank, 432 A.2d 814, 826 (N.J. 1981) (holding that
the directors had a duty to prevent other directors from misappropriating trust
funds and breached their duty by not taking an active role in the corporation).
181. See PRINCIPLES, supra note 43, § 4.01(c) cmt. c.
182. No. E2003-02124-COA-R3-CV, 2004 WL 1749186 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 5, 2004).
183. See id. at *6.
184. See id. at *1-3.
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The Court of Appeals reviewed the facts in light of Tennessee's
LLC statute requiring that a manager discharge duties in good faith,
in a manner the manager reasonably believes to be in the best inter-
ests of the LLC, and with the care an ordinarily prudent person in a
like position would exercise.' 8 5 The Court of Appeals affirmed the
holding of the trial court that the defendant was negligent in failing to
take any steps to verify that cash and financial records were handled
properly. Such wholesale delegation of duties without proper review
was viewed as a breach of fiduciary obligations. 18 6
The court in the Shell case appeared to reach the right result, ap-
plying a balanced approach to the duty of care. The misconduct in-
volved more than an ordinary level of carelessness-yet was not so
extensive that it amounted to a complete and utter abandonment of
duties. The LLC manager in the case failed to discharge his duties
and the misconduct was substantially below what one would expect of
an LLC manager who acted reasonably. While the decision appeared
to reach the right result, it could have been improved by a more com-
plete explanation of the court's reasoning. In particular it could have
been improved by a discussion of the fact that one normally applies
the business judgment rule, but that given the facts of the case, the
alleged conduct involved a failure to act and as such was not entitled
to the deference of the business judgment rule.
The Shell decision is consistent with corporate precedents that
speak to the failure to actively discharge one's duties. Although the
Shell case arose under an LLC statute requiring the exercise of rea-
sonable care, a similar result was reached under a Delaware LLC op-
erating agreement. In Healthcare Management & Investment
Holdings, LLC v. Feldman, ' 8 7 the LLC sued the Chief Financial Of-
ficer (CFO) of its psychiatric facility, who in turn, sued the LLC when
their relationship broke down. The litigation raised the question of
whether the CFO's liability for breach of a fiduciary duty and for sev-
eral other claims would be limited under the LLC operating agree-
ment. 8 8 The agreement limited the Director's liability except for a
breach of the duty of loyalty or for acts or omissions not in good faith
or which involved gross negligence, intentional misconduct, or a know-
ing violation of law.
In connection with a motion for summary judgment with regard to
the allegations of breaches of the fiduciary duties, the court considered
whether a rational trier of fact could conclude that Feldman's conduct
185. See id. at *6.
186. See id. at *7.
187. No. 1:03CV0323, 2006 WL 2660628 (N.D. Ohio Sept. 15, 2006).
188. See id. at *1-3. The other claims included allegations of misappropriation of
trade secrets, tortious interference of business relationships, and unfair competi-
tion. See id. at *3.
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was grossly negligent. The court also considered whether the business
judgment rule protected Feldman from liability. The court ultimately
reviewed the facts and concluded that a rational trier of fact could con-
clude that Feldman was grossly negligent and that his conduct was
not protected by the business judgment rule.189 The court observed
that the evidence indicated that Feldman failed to set up an organized
structure for the LLC and failed to obtain required licenses before en-
tering into major projects that had to be cancelled in one case, thus
costing significant outlays and professional embarrassment, and in
one situation resulted in the LLC's probation. The court further ob-
served that Feldman had failed to prepare a budget, failed to prepare
financial statements, and failed to open a single facility.19 0
At least in the Shell and Healthcare Management cases, the courts
do not appear to be intervening excessively, but rather appear poised
to provide remedies where conduct is substantially below what would
normally be expected of an LLC manager who acted reasonably. How-
ever, the opinions would have been enhanced had the courts offered
more detailed explanations of their reasoning and of why the business
judgment rule should not insulate the director from liability in failure
to act and/or failure to monitor cases.
3. Guidance on Gradations of Care
The failure to act cases discussed above involving LLC managers
who had failed to assume duties in a rather wholesale fashion present
the easy questions regarding business entity governance. The man-
ager who fails to assume his or her responsibilities violates most for-
mulations of the duty of care whether expressed as a duty to exercise
reasonable care, a duty to refrain from grossly negligent conduct, or
even a duty to refrain from reckless conduct. If the failure to act is
sweeping enough, it might arguably constitute both a breach in the
duty of care and conduct amounting to bad faith.191 As indicated in
Part III.B, in ATR-Kim Eng Financial Corp. v. Araneta,19 2 two direc-
tors were jointly liable where they had failed to implement a reporting
or monitoring system that amounted to an intentional abandonment
of duties tantamount to a breach of the duty of loyalty. These failure-
to-act situations present the easy cases because the directors' omis-
sions were so extensive and complete. The more difficult challenges
are to distinguish ordinary negligence from gross negligence and to
refine the circumstances in which the business judgment rule should
apply.
189. See id. at *11-12.
190. See id. at *11.
191. See supra Part IV.D.2.
192. No. CIV. A. 489-N, 2006 WL 3783520 (Del. Ch. Dec. 21, 2006), affd, No. 60, 2007
WL 1704647 (Del. June 14, 2007).
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For example, Johnson v. Songwriter Collective, LLC presents de-
partures from care that are less extreme than those in the failure-to-
act cases described above.19 3 In Johnson, the District Court for the
Middle District of Tennessee was asked to dismiss an allegation of
negligence against the management of an LLC that was created to
manage music of songwriters and to convert royalties from songwrit-
ing into cash flow.19 4 The plaintiffs asserted that defendants had vio-
lated section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and also
alleged that the defendants had violated Tennessee's duty of care pro-
vision when they induced plaintiffs to transfer a catalog of his music
compositions. 195 The plaintiff alleged that the defendants failed to
disclose a variety of risks and erroneously stated that the plaintiff
would realize a substantial writer's draw from the investment.196
The decision required the court to determine whether the facts
stated were sufficient to support an allegation of negligence. The Ten-
nessee LLC statute follows the typical corporate approach and re-
quires LLC managers to exercise the care an ordinary person in a like
position would exercise under similar circumstances. 19 7 Although the
court stopped short of defining negligence, it indicated that the allega-
tions made in the complaint had supported plaintiffs theory of negli-
gence. 198 The allegations appearing to support the negligence theory
included the failure to perform due diligence with respect to LLC
members' catalogs of music and amounts payable,199 the loss of sensi-
tive financial information, 20 0 and the failure to ensure adequate capi-
tal to service a bridge loan. 20
One reading of the case is that the "negligent" manager apparently
includes one who attempts to discharge his or her duties but does so in
a deficient manner. However, the defendants' duty of care violations
are somewhat interwoven with the allegations of fraud. The court ap-
parently found it difficult to isolate the duty of care infractions and
was disturbed by allegations of bad faith, i.e., involving failures to dis-
close key facts and the making of misrepresentations. 20 2 Ultimately,
the Court refused to dismiss the allegations of negligence and breach
of the duty of loyalty. However, the discussion of negligence was lim-
ited and the alleged loss of financial data might not have justified judi-
cial action alone if viewed independently of the duty of loyalty issues.
193. No. 3:05-0320, 2006 WL 861490 (M.D. Tenn. Mar. 28, 2006).
194. See id. at *14-15.
195. See id. at *7, *14.
196. See id. at *3.
197. See id. at *15.
198. See id.
199. See id. at *5.
200. See id.
201. See id.
202. See id. at *3-4, *16.
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On the other hand, the alleged failure to perform due diligence is the
sort of infraction that most courts would regard as a breach of fiduci-
ary duty.
The Johnson case illustrates the need for increased guidance,
whether from the judiciary or the legislature, regarding the distinc-
tions among ordinary negligence, gross negligence, recklessness, and
intentional misconduct in the context of LLC legislation. As more
fully discussed in Part V, it is recommended that LLC legislation in-
clude a statement that the LLC manager is expected to act reasona-
bly, subject to the business judgment rule. The failure to perform
one's duties and/or the performance of duties in a manner that in-
volves a substantial deviation from reasonable care should be suffi-
cient grounds for equitable remedies. Investors should not have to
wait until conduct has deteriorated to the point of involving wanton
conduct or intentional harm to obtain equitable remedies. It is sug-
gested that liability for damages be premised upon gross negligence,
with gross negligence constituting a substantial departure from the
standard of ordinary care but not necessarily amounting to reckless-
ness or intentional harm. 20 3 This is consistent with the concept of
recklessness as a level of misconduct more severe than gross negli-
gence under draft versions of the Restatement (Third) of Torts.20 4
203. See id. at *8 (indicating in its discussion of recklessness and a 10b5 allegation,
that recklessness involves highly unreasonable conduct which is an extreme de-
parture from the standards of ordinary care: "[w]hile the danger need not be
known, it must at least be so obvious that any reasonable man would have
known it .... It is 'a mental state apart from negligence and akin to a conscious
disregard"').
204. See IND. CODE ANN. § 23-1-35-1 cmt. (LexisNexis 1999) (citing WILLIAM L. PROS-
SER & W. PAGE KEETON, THE LAw OF TORTS 212 (W. P. Keeton ed., 5th ed. 1984));
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTs: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL HARM § 2 cmt. a (Tenta-
tive Draft No. 1, 2001):
Taken at face value, [gross negligence] simply means negligence that is
especially bad. Given this literal interpretation, gross negligence carries
a meaning that is less than recklessness. The term "willful or wanton
misconduct" is also frequently employed. "Willful misconduct" some-
times refers to conduct involving an intent to cause harm; but "Wanton
misconduct" is commonly understood to mean recklessness. Frequently,
courts refer to conduct that displays a "reckless disregard for risk" or a
"reckless indifference to risk." When a person's conduct creates a known
risk that can be reduced by relatively moderate precautions, to state that
the person displays a reckless disregard for risk is equivalent to stating
that the person's conduct is reckless.
But see LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12:1314(B), (C) (Supp. 2008), providing that gross
negligence for purposes of the LLC statute means recklessness:
B. Notwithstanding the provisions of Subsection A of this Section, a
member or manager shall not be personally liable to the limited liability
company or the members thereof for monetary damages unless the mem-
ber of manager acted in a grossly negligent manner as defined in Subsec-
tion C of this Section, or engaged in conduct which demonstrates a
greater disregard of the duty of care than gross negligence, including but
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4. Circumventing Corporate Duties Through the LLC
LLC case law has not only raised questions concerning the applica-
tion of the standard of care with regard to the LLC manager, but also
has raised questions concerning the application of the fiduciary duties
when there is an overlap between corporate officers and/or directors
and an LLC. In Barbieri v. Swing-N-Slide Corp.,205 a director and
several officers of Swing-N-Slide, a Delaware corporation, formed a
limited liability company, Greengrass Management, LLC, and a gen-
eral partnership, Greengrass Holdings, for the purpose of making a
tender offer for the stock of Swing-N-Slide. The general partnership
that was to make the tender offer was owned by one partner who was
unaffiliated with Swing-N-Slide, but the other partner was Green-
grass Management, LLC, a newly-formed LLC that was owned by the
senior management of Swing-N-Slide. Plaintiffs alleged that Green-
grass, LLC owed a fiduciary duty to the corporation's shareholders.
Plaintiffs argued that the directors and officers of Swing-N-Slide could
not circumvent their fiduciary duties through the use of the general
partnership and the LLC. The court agreed with the shareholders,
holding that management owed a fiduciary duty to the shareholders,
and the fiduciary duties of management had to be imputed to the LLC
they formed. The court ultimately refused to grant the defendants'
motion to dismiss the plaintiffs claim against the LLC. The court ob-
served that where allegations support the conclusion that an entity
was formed and controlled by fiduciaries for the purposes solely re-
lated to the entity to which those persons owed fiduciary duties, the
entity assumes the same fiduciary obligations.2O6
The facts of Swing-N-Slide expose the potential for the abusive use
of the LLC and/or other entities to circumvent fiduciary duties or to
side-step other legal obligations. The decision highlights the advan-
tage of developing coherence among fiduciary duties in different busi-
ness entities. It also underscores the importance of looking behind the
form to the substance of a transaction to ensure that it has a bona fide
business purpose and is not a subterfuge for evading legal
responsibilities. 20 7
not limited to intentional tortuous conduct or intentional breach of his
duty of loyalty.
C. As used in this Section "gross negligence" shall be defined as reckless
disregard of or a carelessness amounting to indifference to the best inter-
ests of the limited liability company or the members thereof.
205. C.A. No. 14239, 1997 WL 55956 (Del. Ch. Jan. 29, 1997).
206. See id. at *1-3.
207. See In re USACafes, 600 A.2d 43, 48-50 (Del. Ch. 1991) (involving a suit by lim-
ited partners against the corporate general partner as well as the individual di-
rectors of the corporate general partner alleging that the Board members had
received certain side payments that should have gone to the partnership for the
sale of assets and observing that directors of a corporate general partner owe
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In conclusion, with regard to the statutory LLC landscape, almost
equal numbers of states formulate the duty of care using some type of
ordinary care language or using a standard tied to the duty to refrain
from gross negligence or recklessness. Most states place restrictions
on indemnification provisions and permit the LLC to indemnify only if
there has been a good faith reasonable belief that the conduct was in
the best interests of the LLC or not opposed to its best interests. Also,
most states place some restrictions on the extent to which the LLC
operating agreement may contractually alter the duty of care. Dela-
ware's statutory law appears to be the most liberal. It both permits
unlimited contractual waivers, except for the implied covenant of good
faith and fair dealing, and permits the LLC to indemnify the LLC
manager for all types of claims without apparent statutory restriction.
This provides an unwarranted discrepancy between indemnification
standards applicable to corporations and to LLCs. It remains to be
seen whether courts will impose public policy limitations to the extent
to which a private agreement can insulate a manager from liability for
acts of bad faith towards the entity.208
The infrastructure cases highlight the need to articulate a stan-
dard based on the duty to act reasonably. Although all investors
should be entitled to protection from breaches in the duty of loyalty
and the duty of care, a standard based simply on a duty to refrain
from grossly negligent conduct seems inappropriate particularly
where critical services are involved, whether in nursing home care,
environment remediation, or other important fields. By and large, as
demonstrated by the Shell and Healthcare Management cases, at least
some courts appear to be applying the corporate model in a balanced
fashion, intervening where conduct involves substantial departures
from reasonable conduct. It is clear that the LLC manager cannot
delegate duties in a wholesale fashion. While the right results appear
to have been reached in the failure-to-act cases, it would be helpful for
courts to more fully articulate their reasoning, more fully define their
terms, and more thoughtfully provide guidance with respect to the
scope of the business judgment rule. Finally, as illustrated by Bar-
fiduciary duties to the partnership and to the limited partners which extend to
dealings with the partnership's property or dealings affecting its business, and
thus fiduciary duties could not be evaded); see also Tobias v. First City Nat'l Bank
& Trust Co., 709 F. Supp. 1266, 1277-78 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (finding that plaintiffs
stated a claim against the controlling shareholder of a corporate general partner
for breach of fiduciary duty); Remenchik v. Whittington, 757 S.W.2d 836, 837,
839 (Tex. App. 1988) (holding the controlling shareholder of a corporate general
partner liable).
208. See Lazarus v. Am. Real Estate Partners, L.P., No. CIV.A.16788, 2001 WL
1045643, at *8, *11 (Del. Ch. Sept. 6, 2001) (indicating that courts have not yet
been faced with an agreement that sought to insulate a general partner in a lim-
ited partnership for acts of bad faith and, thus, have not yet needed to decide
whether such an agreement would violate Delaware public policy).
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bieri v. Swing-N-Slide Corp., there is a need for coherence in the appli-
cation of fiduciary duties across business entities and to prevent the
use of one business entity to circumvent fiduciary duties arising in
another entity. One should not be able to sanitize one's conduct or
side-step fiduciary duties by structuring transactions through an LLC.
V. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR DUTIES IN THE LLC
As indicated at the start, NCCUSL's discussions concerning the
duty of care sparked significant controversy and ignited a heated dia-
logue among participants. On the eve of the presentation of the Re-
vised Uniform Limited Liability Company Act on the floor of the
National Conference in July 2006, some committee members contin-
ued to debate the duty of care provisions. The first Uniform Limited
Liability Company Act had followed the Revised Uniform Partnership
Act language providing that the duty of care is "limited to refraining
from engaging in grossly negligent or reckless conduct, intentional
misconduct, or a knowing violation of law."209 Some passionately sup-
ported the continued use of the Revised Uniform Partnership Act lan-
guage, arguing that the standard of care for partners and corporate
directors is gross negligence. Others thought that the standard of care
would be better stated as a duty to exercise due care subject to the
business judgment rule-a result which, like the gross negligence for-
mulation, leads to damages where there has been gross negligence in
business decision-making, but which also offers broader remedies in a
wider range of contexts and conveys the hope or aspiration that behav-
ior will be reasonable. Supporters of the gross negligence formulation
feared the reasonable care approach would trigger an avalanche of lit-
igation that would impose liability for mere negligence and would
place courts in the business of managing LLCs.
This Article argues in favor of the language ultimately adopted by
the NCCUSL Committee requiring that "[s]ubject to the business
judgment rule, the duty of care... is to act with the care that a person
in a like position would reasonably exercise under similar circum-
stances and in a manner the member reasonably believes to be in the
best interests of the company."2 10 In this manner, it is hoped that
courts will continue to demonstrate appropriate deference for business
decision-making, but will intervene to impose damages where there is
a substantial departure from the standard to act reasonably. 2 1 1 The
Delaware statutory approach permitting the complete contractual
209. UNIF. LTD. LiAB. Co. ACT § 409(c) (1996).
210. REVISED UNIF. LTD. LIAB. Co. ACT § 409(c) (2006).
211. Harry Haynsworth, former Dean of William Mitchell Law School, vigorously ar-
gued that the Revised Uniform Limited Liability Company Act should contain
guidance as to the business judgment rule. However, these discussions arose late
in the drafting process and the suggestion was not followed.
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elimination of fiduciary duties is rejected.2 12 Instead, it is recom-
mended that parties be permitted to contractually modify or elaborate
on fiduciary duties, but not eliminate them. 2 13 A similarly moderate
position is taken with respect to indemnification provisions. Dela-
ware's approach of permitting indemnification for all claims whatso-
ever is rejected. Instead, it is suggested that the LLC be permitted to
indemnify the LLC manager for selected violations, but not for acts or
omissions that were not in good faith, where an improper personal
benefit was taken, where there was willful misconduct, or where there
was a conscious disregard for the best interests of the company.
The above recommendations, hereinafter described as the
"Mandatory Core/Reasonable Care Approach" to the duty of care, best
accomplish the overall social policy goal of business entity govern-
212. See Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Limiting Contractual Freedom in Corporate Law: The
Desirable Constraints on Charter Amendments, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1820, 1850-51
(1989) (observing that complete opting out of corporate law rules is likely to be
undesirable where a value-decreasing amendment is strongly redistributive in
favor of the managers and where rules protect the value to shareholders by
preventing minority freeze-outs).
213. The recommended approach agrees with the approach taken in REVISED UNIF.
LTD. LiAB. Co. ACT § 110(d)(3) (2006), which permits the alteration of the duty of
care except to authorize intentional or knowing violation of the law. However,
the Revised Act permits the elimination of the duty to account-an essential part
of the duty of loyalty and the elimination of the duty of loyalty is not recom-
mended. See id. § 110(d)(1). Although the discussion above does not address the
duty of loyalty, the reasoning that supports the prohibition on the elimination of
the duty of care also supports the prohibition on the elimination of the duty of
loyalty, see § 110(d), providing:
(d) If not manifestly unreasonable, the operating agreement may:
(1) restrict or eliminate the duty:
(A) as required in Section 409(b)(1) and (g), to account to the
limited liability company and to hold as trustee for it any prop-
erty, profit, or benefit derived by the member in the conduct or
winding up of the company's business, from a use by the mem-
ber of the company's property, or from the appropriation of a
limited liability company opportunity;
(B) as required in Section 409(b)(2) and (g), to refrain from deal-
ing with the company in the conduct or winding up of the com-
pany's business as or on behalf of a party having an interest
adverse to the company; and
(C) as required by Section 409(b)(3) and (g), to refrain from com-
peting with the company in the conduct of the company's busi-
ness before the dissolution of the company;
(2) identify specific types or categories of activities that do not vio-
late the duty of loyalty;
(3) alter the duty of care, except to authorize intentional misconduct
or knowing violation of law;
(4) alter any other fiduciary duty, including eliminating particular
aspects of that duty; and
(5) prescribe the standards by which to measure the performance of
the contractual obligation of good faith and fair dealing under Sec-
tion 409(d).
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ance-to foster investor confidence while keeping transaction costs at
a minimum. 2 14 Investors need assurance that there is a legal system
that will enforce reasonable expectations that management will be-
have with loyalty and with reasonable care. Specifically the
Mandatory Core/Reasonable Care approach: 1) is consistent with the
duty of care rooted in agency law, is suitable to the range of opera-
tional and policy-oriented duties undertaken by LLC managers, and is
appropriate particularly in light of the important nature of the ser-
vices provided by some LLCs; 2) provides a broad general standard
that can be applied across all business entities and is consistent with
the development of a unified business entity statute; 3) best fulfills the
socializing role of the duty of care; 4) allows the opportunity for pro-
viding appropriate equitable or legal remedies, enabling investors to
remove entrenched management before misconduct deteriorates to the
point of becoming reckless or intentionally harmful; and 5) is consis-
tent with the policy of tort and regulatory business law to promote
responsible business conduct. Finally, it is suggested that courts con-
tinue to seek a balanced case-by-case approach to the duty of care.
Judicial remedies should be made available only when the misbehav-
ior is more serious than ordinary inadvertence, but need not be made
available only when the misconduct has become so egregious as to
amount to an intentional, reckless, or utter abandonment of duties.
A. The Duty to Act Reasonably is Rooted in Agency Law
As indicated in Part II.C, LLC managers may perform operational
as distinguished from business policy decision-making. The standard
to act reasonably is well grounded in agency law and is therefore well
suited to the LLC structure. In the drafting of the Revised Uniform
Limited Liability Company Act, an early attempt was made to formu-
late a separate duty of care for operational as distinguished from dis-
214. See Parisi, supra note 17, at xxviii (discussing the role of economic institutions in
reducing the costs of coordinating market activity and its origination with Ronald
Coase in his 1937 article The Nature of the Firm); see also James McConvill &
Mirko Bagaric, Opting Out of Shareholder Governance Rights: A New Perspective
on Contractual Freedom in Australian Corporate Law, 3 DEPAUL Bus. & COMM.
L.J. 255, 271 (2005) (discussing the view of the corporation as a nexus of con-
tracts); Richard A. Posner, Law and the Theory of Finance: Some Intersections, 54
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 159, 163 (1986) (discussing the so-called "free-rider" problem
and the need for constraints on the pursuit of self-gain, and indicating that fi-
nance theorists refer to this problem as agency costs); COMm. ON CAPITAL MKTS.
REGULATION, INTERIM REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON CAPITAL MARKETS REGULA-
TION xi (Nov. 30, 2006), available at http://www.capmktsreg.org/pdfs/11.30Com-
mitteeInterimReportREV2.pdf (emphasizing the role of legal regulation in
promoting investor confidence, indicating that to make a reduction of regulatory
intensity an end in itself would be self-defeating and stressing that investors and
companies raising capital participate in markets where they feel safe by virtue of
effective laws and rules vigorously enforced).
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cretionary conduct. The duty to act reasonably was thought most
appropriate to operational duties. However, it is difficult to defini-
tively separate out operational from discretionary duties. Some opera-
tional functions might involve policy decision-making. For example,
the development of safety protocols may involve an interplay between
operational and policy functions. It would be difficult for a statute to
exhaustively define and distinguish operational from policy-oriented
decision-making. A more practical approach is to retain an overall
statutory standard to act reasonably to be tempered with the business
judgment rule on a case-by-case basis.
B. Fine-Tuning to the Facts and Circumstances and
Suitable to a Unified Business Entity Statute
As indicated in Part II.D, the duty of care should serve as a guide-
line that reflects the standard of care that is expected. Now that a
multiplicity of business forms dot the business entity landscape, the
need for comprehensive and integrated rules has become apparent.
NCCUSL has formed a new drafting committee to draft a uniform
business entity structure that would bring all types of partnerships,
LLCs, and corporations under one statutory umbrella. The standard
of care selected for a Uniform Limited Liability Company Act should
be capable of being tailored to a wide variety of facts and circum-
stances and a range of relationships among investors and
management. 2 15
A formulation to act with the care that a person in a like position
would reasonably exercise under similar circumstances offers a broad
standard that can be applied across all business entities, yet can be
fine-tuned depending upon the particular setting and management
structure.
J. William Callison has argued that where all investors participate
in the venture, such as in a general partnership, each participant has
an incentive and the power to monitor the business. 2 1 6 Callison main-
tains that in such a setting, the risk of a co-participant's ordinary neg-
215. See William T. Allen, Jack B. Jacobs & Leo Strine, Jr., Function over Form: A
Reassessment of Standards of Review in Delaware Corporation Law, 56 Bus.
LAw. 1287, 1297 (2001) (recommending that a standard of review should be func-
tional by providing judges with a practical and logical framework, avoiding need-
less complexity, and offering an alignment with the public policies that animate
the corporate law by providing incentives for directors to act in furtherance of
corporate and stockholder interests and by deferring to outcomes reached
through intra-corporate dispute resolution). See generally William H. Clark, Jr.,
What the Business World is Looking For in an Organizational Form: The Penn-
sylvania Experience, 32 WAKE FoREST L. REV. 149 (1997) (discussing the variety
of and need for multiple business forms).
216. See Callison, supra note 7, at 473, 483 (arguing against a statutory standard for
the LLC).
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ligence is arguably considered a cost of doing business and a slightly
lower standard of care may be appropriate. However, as the structure
moves to one involving centralized management, a higher degree of
trust is imparted to management and a higher level of care is expected
of management.
A formulation of care based on a duty to act reasonably subject to
the business judgment rule provides the flexibility to tailor the appro-
priate standard to the facts and circumstances and the relationship
between the investors and management. Also, it provides a high
enough standard of conduct to achieve the law's socializing goals and
to reflect most investors' reasonable expectations of how management
should conduct itself. Not all investors may initially invest in the LLC
and participate in the drafting of an LLC operating agreement. Some
parties may become investors in the LLC as transferees where, for
example, they inherit the LLC interest or become creditors by virtue
of an LLC member's bankruptcy. The recommended approach would
permit considerable private contracting surrounding the duty of care.
However, it would still require a minimum mandatory standard of
conduct that most investors would be likely to expect of responsible
management. By maintaining a behavioral floor of reasonable con-
duct, the recommended standard is likely to be consistent with most
investors' general expectations of management, including those inves-
tors who have not had the opportunity to expressly negotiate LLC op-
erating agreement terms.
While the standard to act with the care that a person in a like posi-
tion would reasonably exercise under the circumstances protects those
who may not have participated in LLC operating agreement negotia-
tions, it remains a moderate standard that would leave room for busi-
ness risk-taking. It avoids the term negligence and minimizes
confusion with a standard based on simple negligence that might oth-
erwise chill the taking of reasonable risks. For similar reasons, the
Revised Model Business Corporation Act avoids terms like prudence,
which might deter reasonable risk-taking.2 17 It is suggested that LLC
statutes similarly avoid terms such as prudence in their duty of care
sections.
As discussed in Part II, LLCs may vary considerably. They may be
public or private and may be engaged in a broad spectrum of activi-
ties. While setting forth a broad general standard of conduct, the rec-
ommended approach also leaves room for an analysis of
reasonableness under the particular facts and circumstances of each
217. See REVISED MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT. § 8.30 cmts. (2005) (indicating that the
traditional formulation for a director's care has been geared to the ordinarily pru-
dent person but that the use of the term suggests that negligence is the proper
determinant for measuring deficient and thus actionable performance and this
has caused confusion and misunderstanding).
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situation. Both the management configuration and the public or pri-
vate nature of the firm affect the investor's reasonable expectations of
management. Also, the level of judicial scrutiny may be subtly influ-
enced by the relative power of the investors vis-a-vis management or
the nature of the investor as a voluntary investor or as a creditor.
Courts may be especially inclined to assume a more active monitoring
posture in an LLC involving the private passive investor. Like the
investor in a privately owned limited partnership, the passive LLC
member may be more vulnerable to managerial misconduct than in
other settings. The manager of a privately owned, manager-managed
LLC lacks the incentive to care that may be present in a general part-
nership in which personal liability is imposed. The manager of the
privately owned, manager-managed LLC also lacks the direct over-
sight brought by the participation of other investors. On the other
hand, the manager of the privately owned LLC may be free of corpo-
rate constraints typically springing from board of director oversight of
officer performance. Internal controls stemming from audit commit-
tee oversight of a board of directors may be lacking. At the same time,
the LLC manager may have significant control over the preparation of
the limited liability company agreement. The formulation to act with
the care that a person in a like position would reasonably exercise,
subject to the business judgment rule allows judicial leeway to adjust
the level of judicial deference depending upon the facts and circum-
stances. Finally, it is a standard that has its roots in corporate law
and is capable of being applied across all types of business enterprises.
Thus, it is a formulation that would work well in jurisdictions that
adopt a unified business entity statute. 2 18
C. A Socializing Influence for the Private Market
In the large scheme of things, the central role of business entity
governance is to foster investor confidence while not unduly raising
transaction costs. 2 19 Factors that work either singly or in combina-
tion to create opportunities for abuse in the absence of a public market
include: 1) domination by a controlling owner in the management of
the firm or in developing its operating agreement; 2) the separation of
ownership and managerial control; 3) vulnerability resulting from the
illiquid nature of the investment; and/or 4) decreased transparency
and accountability resulting from reduced requirements concerning fi-
nancial reporting and internal controls.
The above potential difficulties are exacerbated in the context of
the LLC because of its highly contractual nature. If the LLC operat-
218. The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws has commis-
sioned a committee to develop a unified business entity statute.
219. See sources cited supra note 214.
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ing agreement has been drafted by management, it may well include a
sole discretion clause and/or other provisions intended to immunize
even the most outrageously irresponsible or self-serving conduct. 220
Although the empirical findings challenge the assumption that that
passive LLC investors and minority investors are not represented,
there may be unequal levels of legal representation as between active
and passive participants and controlling and minority investors. The
empirical studies on the contractual playing field are not conclusive
but certainly raise questions regarding the fairness of the contractual
playing field.221
The need to preserve minimum mandatory fiduciary duties is even
more compelling in the LLC than in other private entities precisely
because of its inherent flexibility, its highly contractual character, and
the possibility that there may be an unequal contractual playing field.
The privilege of contractual flexibility should not be without outer
statutory limits as to basic acceptable management conduct. LLC
statutes and the courts that enforce them play a prominent role in
defining the social context of the LLC. The social context of the firm
conveys important social cues on expectations of trustworthy behav-
ior. To effectively promote responsible management and to deter op-
portunistic conduct, it is important for the LLC statutory skeleton to
promote and reflect reasonable expectations of trustworthiness within
the context of defined business relationships. 2 22
Although the avoidance of unnecessary costs is an important policy
goal, investors must have confidence that responsible and trustworthy
management conduct is expected. While the quality of management is
to a large extent part of the investor's risk, the investor must have
confidence that the law will provide a remedy in cases of sustained
220. See Paul M. Altman & Srinivas M. Raju, Delaware Alternative Entities and the
Implied Contractual Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing Under Delaware
Law, 60 Bus. LAW. 1469, 1484-85 (2005) (suggesting the use of a discretionary
clause that allows the general partner to disregard the consideration of the inter-
ests or factors affecting the partnership or the limited partners, thus providing
language that would be expressly inconsistent with the requirement that discre-
tion be exercised reasonably).
221. See generally Miller, Empirical Glimpse, supra note 9, at 618, 623, app. at 643
(finding that in firms with active participants, a greater percentage of respon-
dents reported representing the controlling member than the minority (84% v.
67%), that while 44% indicated that they "often" represented controlling mem-
bers, only 10% said they did so with regard to the minority, and also finding
disparities between legal representation of controlling members as compared to
the minority in firms with passive investors (64% v. 55%)).
222. See Seana Valentine Shiffrin, The Divergence of Contract and Promise, 120 HARv.




inattention or substantial departures from standards of
reasonableness .223
A statutory standard that insulates a manager from liability for
grossly negligent conduct conveys the wrong signal as to acceptable
business conduct. Some decisions have interpreted gross negligence to
be conduct that "involves a devil-may-care attitude or indifference to
duty amounting to recklessness." 224 A statutory formulation that lim-
its the duty of care to a duty to refrain from grossly negligent conduct
has been described as sending a "socially impoverished message."22 5
The attractiveness of the LLC largely rests on its flexibility. However,
to prevent the LLC from becoming an instrument of exploitation and a
vehicle through which fundamental fiduciary duties of corporations
can be circumvented, the LLC statutory framework should retain and
articulate positive standards of acceptable management conduct.
The purpose of the standard of care is not to protect third parties
vis-a-vis the business entity-the regulation of the LLC's underlying
business is the province of administrative and tort law. Rather, the
focus of business entity governance generally is to allocate the risk of
loss for misconduct among investors, management, and the business
entity. Nevertheless, the standard established as the duty of care-
both its letter and spirit-should not violate broad public policy goals
or work at cross-purposes with fundamental regulatory goals. There
is arguably a major disconnect between a business entity governance
standard resting on the duty to refrain from grossly negligent conduct,
as that term has been interpreted, and widely accepted standards of
223. The emphasis on the efficiency of legal rules is rooted in the works of scholars at
the University of Chicago including, but not limited to Ronald Coase and Richard
Posner. The New Haven School associated with Guido Calabresi emphasizes the
role ofjustice and fairness as well as efficiency and envisions an increased role for
statutory and governmental intervention. See NICHOLAS MERCURO & STEVEN G.
MEDEMA, ECONOMICS & THE LAw: FROM POSNER TO POST-MODERNISM 81-83
(1997) (comparing the Chicago School of Economics with the New Haven school
that endorses a broader role for government intervention and embraces the role
of justice and fairness as well as market efficiencies); see also Bebchuk, supra
note 212, at 1849 (arguing against complete opting out where the benefits exceed
the costs such as where there may be self-dealing); Blair, Trust, supra note 45, at
1736 (observing that the phenomenon of trust provides insight into the nature
and purpose of fiduciary duty); John C. Coffee, Jr., The Mandatory/Enabling
Balance in Corporate Law: An Essay on the Judicial Role, 89 COLUM. L. REV.
1618, 1676-83 (1989) (discussing that whether to allow opting out of corporate
law depends on the public ramifications of allowing private innovation and the
efficiency of the judicial system in addressing conflicts, among other considera-
tions); Mitchell J. Wiet, 14 ANNALS HEALTH L. 399, 407 (2005) (observing that
social norms play an important role in promoting individuals to act in compliance
with the law and discussing health care governance).
224. Gelfman v. Weeden Investors, L.P., 859 A.2d 89, 114 (Del. Ch. 2004) (citing Wil-
liam T. Allen et al., Function over Form: A Reassessment of Standards of Review
in Delaware Corporation Law, 56 Bus. LAW. 1287, 1300 (2001)).
225. Vestal, supra note 78, at 573-74.
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conduct under tort and administrative law. A standard tied merely to
a duty to refrain from devil-may-care conduct arguably works at cross-
purposes with third party standards and violates broad public policy
goals of administrative and tort law to encourage responsible conduct
in business management.
A standard based on the duty to act with the care that a person in a
like position would exercise under similar circumstances does not run
contrary to broad public policy under tort and/or administrative law
and does provide a workable framework under a variety of scholarly
approaches to fiduciary duties. Whether one lines up on the side of
the traditionalist or the contractarian, the duty to act with the care
that a person in a like position provides a moderate standard that is
neither overly permissive nor excessively stringent. The traditionalist
expects managers to act in the interest of others and presupposes
mandatory constraints. 22 6 An active judicial posture to enforce con-
straints is expected. Although the traditionalist might lean toward a
slightly more demanding standard, the traditionalist would ulti-
mately welcome active judicial monitoring of standards. Even under
the contractarian approach, the importance of active judicial enforce-
ment of mandatory minimum standards is necessary. The con-
tractarian seeks a cost-minimizing legal environment227 and
mandatory fiduciary duties are generally criticized for increasing
costs. 2 28 However, active judicial monitoring of minimum basic stan-
dards is not fundamentally inconsistent with contractarian theory. 229
A legal environment that is too permissive arguably fosters aggressive
business practices. Too little statutory or judicial guidance and/or too
great a measure of leniency may create the need for costly individual-
ized contractual innovation to draft self-styled legal protections. In
the long run, too much ambiguity and/or leniency may lead to exces-
226. See Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545, 546 (N.Y. 1928) (establishing a bench-
mark for the duties of co-venturers above the morals of the marketplace); Claire
Moore Dickerson, Equilibrium Destabilized: Fiduciary Duties Under the Uniform
Limited Liability Company Act, 25 STETSON L. REV. 417, 454-55 (1995) (explain-
ing the contractarian worldview and criticizing the contractarian's cost-sensitive
approach to fiduciary duties); see also Lawrence E. Mitchell, The Death of Fiduci-
ary Duty in Close Corporations, 138 U. PA. L. REv. 1675, 1696 (1990) (contending
that in Meinhard, Justice Cardozo 'clearly viewed active compliance with fiduci-
ary norms as a moral imperative"); Vestal, supra note 78, at 573-74 (arguing that
the Revised Uniform Partnership Act sends a "socially impoverished message"
because it narrows the range of fiduciary obligations).
227. See Larry E. Ribstein, The Deregulation of Limited Liability and the Death of
Partnership, 70 WASH. U. L.Q. 417, 473-74 (1992).
228. See Dickerson, supra note 226, at 454-55 (explaining the contractarian
worldview and criticizing the contractarian's cost-sensitive approach to fiduciary
duties). See generally F. HODGE O'NEAL & ROBERT B. THOMPSON, O'NEAL's CLOSE
CORPORATIONS (3d ed. 1998 & Supp. 2002) (providing an exhaustive treatise on
the legal issues commonly encountered by the privately owned corporation).
229. See Coffee, supra note 223, at 1620-21.
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sive costs for structuring and drafting business deals and could lead to
increased rates of litigation. 230 Additionally, active judicial monitor-
ing to enforce a basic standard of reasonable conduct is consistent
with the team production approach to the business entity. Team pro-
duction theorists such as Blair and Stout regard the business entity as
a team, see management as a mechanism that resolves team conflicts,
and believe that this role is best achieved in an environment that fos-
ters trustworthy behavior. 23 1 A standard of conduct based on the duty
to act with the care that a person in a like position would reasonably
exercise under similar circumstances conveys the important social cue
that trustworthy and responsible behavior is appropriate.
In short, the social message conveyed by the standard of care is
more compelling in the LLC than in other entities because of the
LLC's inherent flexibility, its highly contractual nature, and the reali-
ties of the potentially unequal contractual playing field. The expecta-
tion that management must act with the care of a person in a like
position would reasonably exercise under similar circumstances, tem-
pered by the business judgment rule, establishes a reasonable
mandatory minimum standard of conduct. It has the potential to fos-
ter investor confidence and keep transaction costs to a minimum by
providing some certainty in the otherwise fluid LLC environment. It
is a standard that may deter careless conduct and sends the positive
social message that the LLC will not be a safe haven for careless man-
agement. Finally, it is a benchmark that does not run contrary to the
overall public policy goals of tort and administrative law to encourage
responsible management conduct.
D. Fulfilling the Remedial Role
One of the major roles of the duty of care is to foster investor confi-
dence that there are legal and/or equitable remedies that will become
available should the duty of care be violated.232 Remedies may in-
clude legal remedies such as an award of damages and/or the use of
230. See Miller, New Direction, supra note 9, at 420 (reporting that of 199 lawyers who
indicated that they had handled majority/minority disputes, 50% of Delaware re-
spondents indicated that the dispute resulted in litigation, whereas only 21%,
8.6%, and 25% of respondents in California, New York, and Pennsylvania indi-
cated lawsuits were filed). The higher rate of litigation in Delaware could indi-
cate that increased legal ambiguity created by the contractarian approach to
corporate governance actually increases litigation and related legal costs. Of
course many other explanations may be operative including differences in the
relative competency of courts in the different states. Further research is
recommended.
231. See generally Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production Theory of
Corporate Law, 85 VA. L. REv. 247 (1999); Blair, Trust, supra note 45.
232. See Lee, supra note 41, at 262-63 (discussing the rationales underlying the duty
of care).
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injunctive power to restrain certain conduct or transactions, or to de-
velop other equitable remedies that the situation requires.
As previously indicated, the expectation that management must
act with the care of a person in a like position would reasonably exer-
cise under similar circumstances, tempered by the business judgment
rule provides a benchmark that makes sense given the diverse mana-
gerial activities in which LLC managers engage, whether operational,
involving oversight, or entailing decision-making. It ties into the basic
standard of care that is expected of paid agents and thus is a suitable
standard governing operational conduct. Yet, because the standard to
act with the care of a person in a like position would reasonably exer-
cise under the circumstances incorporates the business judgment rule,
it is a viable benchmark for business decision-making and will prevent
excessive judicial intermeddling in business policy decision-making.
Most importantly, the standard to act with the care of a person in a
like position would reasonably exercise would allow investors to ob-
tain equitable remedies before the misconduct has deteriorated to the
point of becoming reckless or intentionally harmful. Equitable reme-
dies should be made available for serious misconduct that substan-
tially departs from the care a person in a like position would
reasonably exercise, but which may not yet be termed reckless. Such
remedies may become critical to enable investors to root out en-
trenched and extremely irresponsible management before the conduct
causes bankruptcy and/or very serious harm to third parties.
The role of business entity governance is primarily to govern the
relationship among investors and between investors and manage-
ment-not to directly regulate business. However, if the LLC is pri-
vately owned and centrally managed under an operating agreement
drafted to protect management, there is a potential for the entrench-
ment of management. A legal framework that permits timely equita-
ble remedies to address entrenched and seriously irresponsible
management in urgent circumstances is in the public interest. Such
equitable remedies may be even more important than they were previ-
ously now that Treasury Regulations permit LLCs to be structured in
a way that eliminates the investor's right to freely withdraw his or her
investment. 23 3 This change in tax treatment has increased the
chances that LLC investors may become "locked-into" their LLC in-
vestment and may leave some LLC investors at the mercy of en-
233. See I.R.C. § 7701 (2000); Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-1 (2006); see also Sandra K.
Miller, What Buy-out Rights, Fiduciary Duties, and Dissolution Remedies Should
Apply in the Case of a Minority Owner of a Limited Liability Company?, 38 HAv.
J. ON LEGIS. 413, 413-14, 416 (2001) (discussing the relaxation of tax require-
ments and the increased potential for investors to be locked into their investment
and recommending a statutory prohibition on unreasonable reductions in fiduci-
ary duties and the remedy for dissolution or buy out in the event of management
deadlock or oppressive conduct by majority owners).
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trenched incompetent management-a possibility all too likely if the
investor has executed a simple form LLC agreement without seriously
studying and negotiating contractual terms, exit rights, or manage-
ment termination provisions. 23 4
Limitations on the complete contractual elimination of the duty of
loyalty and the duty of care could prove essential in removing or re-
straining management. While the usual recourse for misconduct
should be non-judicial in nature, involving termination, removal, and
the like, these remedies may not be available or viable in all circum-
stances. 23 5 Limitations on the complete contractual elimination of du-
ties and a standard tied to reasonableness, subject to the business
judgment rule, provide a reasonable balance between contractual free-
dom and mandatory constraints in an effort to foster responsible busi-
ness conduct.
E. Consistency with Overall Goals of Tort and Other
Business Laws
A standard of care articulated as a duty to act reasonably is consis-
tent with the overall public policy goals of tort and other regulatory
laws to encourage responsible business management. While in prac-
tice, the imposition of liability would only occur where there are sub-
stantial departures from ordinary care by virtue of the business
judgment rule, the positive articulation of a duty to act reasonably is
consistent with overall public policy. Particularly where key services
are offered, whether in the form of electrical power or nursing home
care, a standard of conduct to merely refrain from grossly negligent
conduct appears out-of-place, especially given some courts' definition
of gross negligence as being the equivalent of reckless or intentional
misconduct.
F. A Balanced Approach is Recommended
A balanced approach to the duty of care and the business judgment
rule is recommended. Generally, excessive judicial intervention in
business is undesirable. The forces operating to regulate managerial
performance should stem from sources other than the courtroom. The
LLC operating agreement, monetary awards, internal disciplinary
234. See Miller, Empirical Glimpse, supra note 9, at 618 (finding that 85% of respon-
dents indicated that they sometimes or often have formed no-frills or simple LLC
agreements in a study of practitioners contractual practices in Colorado, Dela-
ware, Kentucky, Minnesota, Montana, and New York); see also Miller, New Direc-
tion, supra note 9, at 383 (finding that approximately two-thirds of practitioners
believed that many LLC agreements formed are based on form agreements that
are not extensively negotiated in a study of contractual practices in California,
Delaware, New York, and Pennsylvania).
235. Jones, supra note 51, at 511-15.
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processes, and terminations should serve to control most instances of
misconduct. However, courts should be positioned to intervene before
behavior degenerates to the point of amounting to a complete and ut-
ter abandonment of duties or intentionally poor performance.
A balanced approach should be taken to the duty of care and to the
business judgment rule. While judicial deference may be typically ap-
propriate with respect to the publicly traded corporation, it should be
recognized that the same level of judicial deference might be ill-suited
to some LLCs. Generally the business judgment rule provides that if
a board demonstrates a minimum level of care, the courts will not re-
view and second-guess the decision that is being challenged.23 6 The
policy justifications for the business judgment rule include the need to
encourage directors to serve and take risks, to prevent courts from
encroaching upon business decisions, and to preserve the autonomy
and central authority of the corporate board of directors.237 These
same policy justifications may not be present in all LLCs. LLCs can
be member-managed, can have one or more LLC managers who may
or may not be owners, or may have a corporate structure consisting of
officers and a board of directors. LLC managers may or may not be
highly compensated, may or may not be highly sophisticated, and may
or may not need particular incentives to serve. Similarly, LLC man-
agers may or may not need encouragement to assume risks, depend-
ing largely on the terms of their compensation arrangements. Some
LLC managers in highly negotiated and sophisticated investments
may have compensation packages that tie compensation to perform-
ance. Others may not. Those that do will presumably have every in-
centive to take risks that will translate into successful performance.
There will only be a need to shore up the central authority of an LLC if
in fact there is centralized management and a board of directors that
needs shoring up vis-&-vis a team of officers. Thus, the policy interests
in fostering service and risk-taking and in promoting the central au-
thority of LLC management do not definitively support a broad formu-
lation of the business judgment rule. 238
In some LLCs there may be compelling reasons to support an ac-
tive judicial posture in monitoring fiduciary duties of LLC managers.
Investors arguably select the highly contractual LLC largely to obtain
236. See Miller & Rutledge, supra note 7, at 345.
237. See Johnson, Corporate Officers, supra note 92, at 455.
238. See Hal R. Arkes & Cindy A. Schipani, Medical Malpractice v. the Business Judg-
ment Rule: Differences in Hindsight Bias, 73 OR. L. REV. 587, 623-24 (1994) (com-
paring the differences in legal treatment of corporate directors and physicians
and discussing the lower tolerance for risk in the case of the physicians); see also
Johnson, Corporate Officers, supra note 92, at 453-65 (discussing the policy ratio-
nales for the business judgment rule in the case of directors including encourag-
ing directors to serve, to take risks, to avoid judicial encroachment into the
business sphere, and to preserve the Board's authority).
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shelter from excessive judicial intrusion into private business matters.
They seek flexibility and freedom in business structure. Nevertheless,
it is precisely in the context of this highly contractual business entity
that investors need the most assurance that courts will enforce certain
basic minimum fiduciary duties.
Unlike corporations, LLCs may be structured without multiple
levels of management that would otherwise provide checks and bal-
ances on each other's powers. In a public corporation, there will be an
audit committee, a board of directors, and corporate officers. Officers
are accountable to the board. In many instances, corporate govern-
ance will be structured to comply with mandatory rules under the rel-
evant stock exchange. 2 39 In contrast, privately owned LLCs need not
create extensive internal accounting controls. LLC operating agree-
ments and managerial employment agreements may be drafted by
management in the best interests of the managers leaving little oppor-
tunity for investors to influence contract terms. Private LLCs are not
subject to restrictions of a stock exchange that might require board
independence and a code of ethics that requires fair dealing, and pro-
hibits theft of opportunities, breaches of confidentiality, and the mis-
use of company assets. Particularly in such private contexts, it is
important for courts to be positioned to enforce certain basic minimal
fiduciary duties. Particularly in the context of the LLC with central-
ized management, managers should be reminded of the outer limits of
acceptable conduct that constrain the private contract. This reminder
is particularly needed in the privately owned LLC with centralized
management where the normal checks and balances created by active
member/management, multiple layers of management, and rigorous
accounting and auditing standards may be absent. An overly expan-
sive interpretation of the business judgment rule can overwhelm the
basic standard that managers must act reasonably and responsibly.
On the other hand, too narrow an interpretation could lead to exces-
sive judicial intrusion into business activities. Thus, a balanced ap-
proach to judicial monitoring is recommended.
239. See New York Stock Exchange, Corporate Governance Rules (2003), http://www.
nyse.com/pdfs/finalcorpgovrules.pdf (last visited Sept. 14, 2007) (providing that
certain listed companies have a majority of independent directors, a nominating/
corporate governance committee composed entirely of independent directors, a
compensation committee composed of entirely independent directors, an audit
committee, disclosed corporate governance guidelines including director orienta-
tion and continuing education, annual performance evaluations, a code of busi-
ness conduct that encompasses rules procedures for waiving the code, rules
against taking corporate opportunities and breaches of confidentiality, fair deal-
ing, and the protection of company assets).
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VI. CONCLUSION
A standard of care based on the duty to act with the care that a
person in a like position would reasonably exercise under similar cir-
cumstances subject to the business judgment rule is recommended.
Such a standard is rooted in agency law, and when coupled with the
business judgment rule, can provide a general benchmark that makes
sense given the operational, oversight, or business policy-making
functions that LLC managers may assume. The reasonable care/busi-
ness judgment rule formulation provides the judicial leeway necessary
to calibrate the standard of judicial review based on the relationship
between the investors and management and the public or private na-
ture of the firm. Particularly where the LLC is privately owned and
centrally managed, a higher degree of trust may be imparted to man-
agement, and a higher level of care may be appropriate. The flexibil-
ity to tighten up the standard of scrutiny in the private, centrally
managed LLC is particularly important given the absence of manage-
rial constraints that flow from restrictive internal controls or from the
direct oversight of active members. Checks and balances provided by
multiple layers of management, the oversight of an audit committee,
or the questioning eye of an independent board of directors may be
present in public corporations but lacking in a privately owned LLC.
In such an environment, it is important to provide a legal standard
that sends a strong, positive message as to the expected standard of
conduct. A standard based on the duty to act with the care that a
person in a like position would reasonably exercise under similar cir-
cumstances subject to the business judgment rule provides a positive
social cue that responsible managerial behavior is expected. Also, it
provides a benchmark that does not run contrary to the overall public
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APPENDIX B. GOOD FAITH/PRUDENT PERSON
LLC Statutes Using Good Faith Prudent Person
Standard of Care Language*
State Statutory Provision
Alaska AiAsKA STAT. § 10.50.135(a) (2004)
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 34-141(a) (West 2005 & Supp.Connecticut208 2008)
Georgia GA. CODE ANN. § 14-11-305(1) (2003)
Iowa IOWA CODE ANN. § 490A.706(1) (West 1999)
Louisiana LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12:1314(A)(1) (1994 & Supp. 2008)
Maine ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 31, § 652(1) (1996 & Supp. 2007)
MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 450.4404(1) (West 2002 & Supp.
Michigan 2007)
Minnesota MINN. STAT. ANN. § 322B.69 (West 2004)
Mississippi Miss. CODE ANN. § 79-29-402(1) (West 1999 & Supp. 2007)
Missouri Mo. ANN. STAT. § 347.088(1) (West 2001 & Supp. 2008)
New York N.Y. LTD. LiAB. Co. LAw § 409(a) (McKinney 2007)
North Carolina N.C. GEN. STAT. § 57C-3-22(b) (2003)
North Dakota N.D. CENT. CODE § 10-32-96 (2007)
Ohio OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1705.29(B) (LexisNexis 2004)
Oklahoma OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 2016(1) (West 1999 & Supp. 2008)
Rhode Island R.I. GEN. LAws § 7-16-17(a) (1999)
Vermont VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 3059(c) (1997)
* The actual language employed varies from statute to statute. For comprehensive
tables, discussion, and analysis of duty of care and duty of loyalty provisions, see BISHOP
& KLEINBERGER, supra note, at 129, 10-16; LARRY E. RIBSTEIN & ROBERT R. KEATINGE,
RIBSTEIN AND KEATINGE ON LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANIES app. 9-1 (2002).
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APPENDIX C. GROSS NEGLIGENCE/WILLFUL MISCONDUCT
LLC Statutes Using Gross Negligence or Willful
Misconduct in Standard of Care Language
STATE STATUTORY PROVISIONS
Alabama ALA. CODE §§ 10-12-21(g), (1)(2) (1999)
Arkansas ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-32-402 (2001)
Florida FLA. STAT. ANN. § 608.4225(1)(b) (West 2007 & Supp. 2008)
District of Columbia D.C. CODE ANN. §29-1003 (LexisNexis 2001)
Hawaii HAw. REV. STAT. § 428-409(c) (2004)
Idaho IDAHO CODE ANN. § 53-622(1) (2000)
805 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 180/15-3 (West 2004 & Supp.
Illinois 2007)
Indiana IND. CODE ANN. § 23-18-4-2 (LexisNexis 1999 & Supp. 2005)
Kentucky Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 275.170(1) (West 2006 & Supp. 2007)
Montana MONT. CODE ANN. § 35-8-310(3) (2005)
New Hampshire N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 304-C:31(IV) (LexisNexis 2005)
New Mexico N.M. STAT. ANN. § 53-19-16(B) (LexisNexis 2001)
Oregon OR. REV. STAT. § 63.155(3) (2003)
South Carolina S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-44-409(c) (2006 & Supp. 2007)
Tennessee TENN. CODE ANN. § 48-249-403(c) (2008)
Utah UTAH CODE ANN. § 48-2c-807(1) (2002 & Supp. 2005)
Washington WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 25.15.155(1) (West 2005)
West Virginia W. VA. CODE ANN. § 31B-4-409(c) (LexisNexis 2003)
Wisconsin Wis. STAT. ANN. § 183.0402(1) (West 2002 & Supp. 2007)
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APPENDIX D. INDEMNIFICATION: BEST INTERESTS
Indemnification Provisions Requiring Good Faith and Reasonable
Belief, Conduct in Best Interests or Not Opposed to Best Interests
of the LLC, or Containing Restrictions Tied to Honesty*
State Statutory Provision
Alaska ALASKA. STAT. § 10.50.148 (2004)
Maine ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 31, § 654 (1996)
Massachusetts MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 156C, § 8 (West 2005 & Supp. 2008)
Minnesota MINN. STAT. ANN. § 322B.699 (West 2004)
Mississippi Miss. CODE ANN. § 79-29-110 (West 1999 & Supp. 2007)
Nevada NEV. REV. STAT. § 86.411 and 86.421 (2007)
New Hampshire N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 304-C:9 (LexisNexis 2005)
New York N.Y. LTD. LiAB. Co. LAW § 420 (McKinney 2007 & Supp. 2008)
North Dakota N.D. CENT. CODE § 10-32-99 (2007)
Tennessee TENN. CODE ANN. § 48-249-115 (2002 & Supp. 2005)
Utah UTAH CODE ANN. § 48-2c-1802 (2002)
* There is some variation in this language. For example, Maine prohibits
indemnification if it is finally adjudicated that the person did not act honestly or in the
reasonable belief that the action was in or not opposed to the best interests of the LLC
or where there is a criminal action or proceeding and there was reasonable cause to
believe that the conduct was unlawful. Minnesota provides that the LLC shall provide
indemnification if the person has not been indemnified by another organization or
employee benefit plan and the person acted in good faith, received no improper personal
benefit or otherwise satisfied provisions concerning conflicts of interest, and reasonably
believed the conduct was in the best interests of the LLC or not opposed to its best
interests. Mississippi and Nevada provide that the LLC may provide indemnification if
the person conducted himself in good faith and he reasonably believed that the conduct
was in the best interests of the LLC or not opposed to its best interests, had no
reasonable cause to believe the conduct was unlawful in the case of a criminal
proceeding, and may not indemnify if the person was adjudged liable to the LLC or in
receipt of an improper personal benefit. New Hampshire permits indemnification if the
person conducted himself in good faith, and reasonably believed the conduct to be in the
best interests of the LLC or not opposed to its best interests, and prohibits
indemnification where the person is adjudged liable to the LLC or liable for a personal
benefit improperly received by him. New York prohibits indemnification if it is
adjudicated that the person exercised bad faith, deliberate dishonesty, or personally
gained. North Dakota permits indemnification if the person was not otherwise
reimbursed, acted in good faith, received no improper personal benefit, had no
reasonable cause to believe the conduct was unlawful in a criminal proceeding, and
reasonably believed the conduct was in the best interests of the LLC or not opposed to
its best interests. Tennessee and Utah permit indemnification if the individual acted in
good faith and reasonably believed the conduct was in the LLC's best interests or not
opposed to its best interests, and had no reasonable cause to believe the conduct was
unlawful in the event of a criminal proceeding.
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APPENDIX E. INDEMNIFICATION: OTHER RESTRICTIONS
Selected Indemnification Provisions Containing
Other Restrictions*
STATE STATUTORY PROVISION
Alabama ALA. CODE § 10-12-4(n) (LexisNexis 1999)
California CAL. CORP. CODE §§ 17155, 17153 (Deering 2006)
Colorado COLO. REV. STAT. § 7-80-407 (2007)
District of D.C. CODE ANN. § 29-1020 (LexisNexis 2001)
Columbia
Florida FLA. STAT. ANN. § 608.4229 (West 2007)
Georgia GA. CODE ANN. § 14-11-306 (2003)
Illinois 805 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 180/15-3 (West 2004 & Supp. 2007)
Iowa IOWA. CODE ANN. § 490A.707 (West 1999 & Supp. 2008)
Louisiana LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12:1315 (1994 & Supp. 2008)
Maryland MD. CODE ANN., CORPS. & ASS'NS § 4A-203(14) (LexisNexis 1999)
MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 450.4407-.4408 (West 2002 & Supp.
Michigan 2007)
Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 347.088(2.2), 347.081 (West 2001 & Supp.Missouri 2082008)
Montana MONT. CODE ANN. § 35-8-107(12) (2005)
North Carolina N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 57C-3-31, -32 (2003)
Ohio OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1705.32 (LexisNexis 2004)
Oklahoma OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 2017 (West 1999 & Supp.2008)
Oregon OR. REV. STAT. § 63.160 (2003)
Pennsylvania 15 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 8510, 8945 (West 1995 & Supp.
2007)
Texas TEx. Bus. ORGS. CODE ANN. § 8.102 (Vernon 2007)
Virginia VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-1025 (1999)
Washington WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 25.15.040 (West 2005)
Wisconsin WiS. STAT. ANN. § 183.0403 (West 2002 & Supp. 2007)
* Various language prohibiting indemnification is employed. Alabama prohibits
indemnification for negligence or misconduct in the performance of duties. California
prohibits indemnification for violations of fiduciary duties. Colorado permits
indemnification if liability incurred without violation of duties to the LLC. The District
of Columbia permits indemnification, but not for willful misconduct. Florida prohibits
indemnification for violations of criminal law, transactions for which improper personal
benefit was received, prohibited distributions were made, or for conduct that amounts to
willful misconduct or a conscious disregard for the best interests of the LLC. Iowa
prohibits indemnification for amounts to which the manager is not entitled, intentional
infliction of harm on the company or its members, for improper distributions, or
intentional violations of law. Maryland prohibits indemnification for willful misconduct
or recklessness. Michigan prohibits indemnification for receipt of financial benefits to
which a manager is not entitled, for improper distributions, or knowing violations of
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law. It is not entirely clear whether Missouri imposes limitations on contractual
indemnification provisions since section 347.088(2.2) provides that duties and liabilities
may be expanded or restricted by the operating agreement, thus possibly implying that
liabilities may not be eliminated by contract, yet section 347.081 broadly states that it is
the policy to give maximum effect to the principle of freedom of contract. Montana
prohibits indemnification in the case of willful misconduct or recklessness. Ohio
requires that the person acted in good faith and reasonably believed the conduct to be in
the LLC's best interests or not opposed to its best interests, had no reason to believe the
conduct was unlawful if arising in a criminal proceeding, and if the person was
adjudged negligent or engaged in misconduct, the court believes that in the
circumstances the person is fairly and reasonably entitled to indemnification.
Oklahoma and Oregon prohibit indemnification for violations of the duty of loyalty, acts
or omissions not in good faith, or where an improper personal benefit was obtained.
Oregon also prohibits indemnification where an unlawful distribution was made.
Pennsylvania prohibits indemnification where a court has found willful misconduct or
recklessness. Texas prohibits indemnification for penalties, fines, taxes, employee
benefit plan excise taxes, willful or intentional misconduct, breach of the duty of loyalty,
or for an act or omission not in good faith that constitutes a breach of duty where
liability is established in a court and appeals have been exhausted or foreclosed.
Virginia prohibits indemnification for willful misconduct or a knowing violation of the
criminal law. Washington prohibits indemnification for intentional misconduct or a
knowing violation of law, or where there was receipt of money, property or services to
which the person was not legally entitled. Wisconsin prohibits indemnification where
there has been a failure to perform duties.
APPENDIX F. INDEMNIFICATION WITHOUT RESTRICTIONS
Indemnification Provisions Without Express
Statutory Restrictions
STATE STATUTORY PROVISION
Arizona ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 29-610 (LexisNexis 1998 & Supp. 2007)
Arkansas ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-32-404(13) (2001 & Supp. 2005)
Connecticut CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 34-143 (West 2005 & Supp. 2008)
Delaware DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-108 (2005)
Idaho IDAHO CODE ANN. § 53-624 (2000)
Kansas KAN. STAT. ANN. § 17-7670 (2007)
Kentucky KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 275.180 (West 2006)
New Jersey N.J. STAT. ANN. § 42:2B-10 (West 2004)
New Mexico N.M. STAT. ANN. § 53-19-18 (LexisNexis 2001 & Supp. 2005)
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APPENDIX G. SAMPLE STATUTORY LANGUAGE
Sample Statutory Language Offering Contractual Freedom
But Prohibiting the Elimination of Duties
I. Simple Provision Permitting Expansion of Duties or
Restriction But Not Elimination
The member's, manager's or other person's duties and liabilities may
be expanded or restricted by provision in the operating agreement.
Mo. ANN. STAT. § 347.088(2) (West Supp. 2008).
II. Permitting Identification of Activities That Do Not
Violate Fiduciary Duties
(b) The operating agreement may not:
(1) unreasonably restrict a right to information or access to records
under [ ];
(2) eliminate the duty of loyalty under [ ], but the agreement
may:
(i) identify specific types or categories of activities that do not violate
the duty of loyalty, if not manifestly unreasonable; and
(ii) specify the number or percentage of members or disinterested
managers that may authorize or ratify, after full disclosure of all ma-
terial facts, a specific act or transaction that otherwise would violate
the duty of loyalty;
(3) unreasonably reduce the duty of care under [ ];
(4) eliminate the obligation of good faith and fair dealing under
1 1, but the operating agreement may determine the standards
by which the performance of the obligation is to be measured, if the
standards are not manifestly unreasonable;
(5) vary the right to expel a member in an event specified in [ ];
(6) vary the requirement to wind up the limited liability company's
business in a case specified in [ ]; or
(7) restrict rights of a person, other than a manager, member, and
transferee of a member's distributional interest, under this chapter.
S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-44-103(b) (2006); UNIF. LTD. LiAB. Co. ACT
§ 103(b) (1996).
III. Prohibiting Elimination of Liability for Breaches of
Duty of Loyalty, Good Faith, Intentional
Misconduct, Unlawful Distributions, or
Receipts of Improper Personal Benefits
(a) Subject to subsection (b), the articles of organization or operating
agreement may eliminate or limit the personal liability of a manager
2008]
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to the limited liability company or to its members for monetary dam-
ages for breach of any duty provided for in [ I.
(b) No provision permitted under subsection (a) may limit or eliminate
the liability of a manager for:
(1) Breach of the manager's duty of loyalty to the limited liability
company or its members;
(2) Acts or omissions not in good faith or which involve intentional
misconduct or a knowing violation of law;
(3) The liability imposed pursuant to the provisions of [
dealing with unlawful distributions or
(4) Any transaction from which the manager derived an improper
personal benefit, unless the transaction was with the informed con-
sent of the members or a majority of the disinterested managers. No
provision eliminating or limiting the personal liability of a manager
will be effective with respect to causes of action arising prior to the
inclusion of the provision in the articles of organization or operating
agreement.
R.I. GEN. LAWS § 7-16-18 (1999).
IV. Extremely Liberal Guidelines on the Delineation of
Duties That Will Not Violate Duties*
(1) The articles of organization or an operating agreement of a limited
liability company may not:
(a) Eliminate completely the duty of loyalty under subsection ( ) of
this section, but the articles of organization or an operating agreement
may:
(A) Identify specific types or categories of activities that do not violate
the duty of loyalty, if not unconscionable; and
(B) Specify the number or percentage of members, whether interested
or disinterested, or disinterested managers that may authorize or rat-
ify, after full disclosure of all material facts, a specific act or transac-
tion that otherwise would violate the duty of loyalty.
(b) Unreasonably reduce the duty of care under subsection ( ) of this
section.
(c) Eliminate completely the obligation of good faith and fair dealing
under... this section, but the articles of organization or an operating
agreement may determine the standards by which performance of the
obligation of good faith and fair dealing is to be measured, if the stan-
dards are not unconscionable.
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(2) For the purposes of subsection ( )( ) of this section, specific types or
categories of activities that may be identified as not violating the duty
of loyalty include, but are not limited to:
(a) Competing with the limited liability company in the conduct of the
business of the limited liability company before the dissolution of the
limited liability company; and
(b) Entering into or engaging in, for a member's own account, an in-
vestment, business, transaction or activity that is similar to the in-
vestments, businesses, transactions or activities of the limited liability
company without:
(A) First offering the limited liability company or the other members
an opportunity to participate in the investment, business, transaction
or activity; or
(B) Having any obligation to account to the limited liability company
or the other members for the investment, business, transaction or ac-
tivity or the profits from the investment, business, transaction or
activity.
OR. REV. STAT. §§ 63.155(10)-(11) (2003).
* This alternative is not recommended.
APPENDIX H. SAMPLE STATUTORY LANGUAGE
Sample Statutory Language Regarding Prohibitions
on Indemnification
No Indemnification for Penalties, Fines, Taxes, Employee
Benefit Excise Taxes, Willful or Intentional Misconduct,
Breach of the Duty of Loyalty, Act or Omission
Not in Good Faith
General Scope of Permissive Indemnification
(a) Subject to Subsection (b), an enterprise may indemnify a governing
person, former governing person, or delegate against:
(1) a judgment; and
(2) expenses, other than a judgment, that are reasonable and actu-
ally incurred by the person in connection with a proceeding.
(b) Indemnification under this subchapter of a person who is found
liable to the enterprise or is found liable because the person improp-
erly received a personal benefit:
(1) is limited to reasonable expenses actually incurred by the person
in connection with the proceeding;
2008]
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(2) does not include a judgment, a penalty, a fine, and an excise or
similar tax, including an excise tax assessed against the person with
respect to an employee benefit plan; and
(3) may not be made in relation to a proceeding in which the person
has been found liable for:
(A) willful or intentional misconduct in the performance of the
person's duty to the enterprise;
(B) breach of the person's duty of loyalty owed to the enterprise; or
(C) an act or omission not committed in good faith that constitutes
a breach of a duty owed by the person to the enterprise.
(c) A governing person, former governing person, or delegate is consid-
ered to have been found liable in relation to a claim, issue, or matter
only if the liability is established by an order, including a judgment or
decree of a court, and all appeals of the order are exhausted or fore-
closed by law.
TEX. Bus. ORGS. CODE ANN. § 8.102 (Vernon 2007).
No Indemnification for Knowing Violations of Laws,
Civil Penalties
An LLC operating agreement should not have the power or be obli-
gated to indemnify a director, officer, or LLC manager for liabilities
and reasonable expenses if:
A) The conduct for which indemnification is sought directly in-
volved a knowing and culpable violation of law or a significant
pecuniary benefit was obtained to which the actor was not le-
gally entitled;
B) To the extent that the indemnification would involve any
amount paid in satisfaction of a fine, civil penalty, or similar
judgment as a result of violation of statutory law, the policy of
which clearly precludes indemnification;
C) If the indemnification would involve any amount paid in set-
tlement of the proceeding and the conduct directly involved a
violation of statutory law, the policy of which clearly precludes
indemnification;
D) To the extent that the indemnification would involve amounts
paid (i) in satisfaction of a judgment or in settlement of an
action that was brought by or in the right of the LLC, or (ii) for
expenses incurred in any such proceeding in which the actor
was adjudged liable to the LLC, except for certain court-or-
dered indemnification.
See PRINCIPLES, supra note 43, at § 7.20(b).
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APPENDIX I. RATIO OF LLC FILINGS TO
CORPORATE FILINGS, 2006
The data appearing below was taken from the International Asso-
ciation of Commercial Administrators, Annual Report of the Juris-
dictions, 2007, http://www.iaca.org/downloads/AnnualReports/2007-
IACAAR.pdf. The LLC filings include the filings of domestic LLCs
plus the foreign LLCs filed during 2006. The Corporate filings re-
ported include the filings of business and professional corporations.
STATE LLC CORPORATIONS RATIO OF LLC'sTO CORPS
Alabama
Alaska 3,533 1,984 1.78
Arizona 51,832 15,611 3.32
Arkansas 9,034 7,293 1.24
California 73,334 106,572 .69
Colorado 50,367 20,092 2.51
Connecticut 24,460 4,389 5.57
Delaware 97,942 34,384 2.85
Florida 130,251 165,234 .79
Georgia
Hawaii 8,641 4,099 2.11
Idaho 11,560 5,264 2.20
Illinois 27,583 45,268 .61
Indiana 20,623 12,746 1.62
Iowa
Kansas 9,318 5,684 1.64
Kentucky 14,872 7,120 2.09
Louisiana 31,160 7,574 4.11
Maine 4,617 3,415 1.35
Maryland 32,388 19,445 1.67
Massachusetts 15,291 12,984 1.18
Michigan 48,905 20,828 2.35
Minnesota 20,553 13,217 1.56
Mississippi 11,802 6,178 1.91
Missouri 32,439 8,472 3.83
Montana 9,987 4,374 2.28
Nebraska 5,352 3,960 1.35
Nevada 41,459 37,843 1.10
New Hampshire 9,022 3,244 2.78
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New Jersey 55,614 26,329 2.11
New Mexico
New York 55,762 81,877 .68
North Carolina 33,575 24,255 1.38
North Dakota 1,805 2,390 .76
Ohio 49,253 13,594 3.62
Oklahoma 16,747 7,362 2.27
Oregon 24,123 10,529 2.29
Pennsylvania 31,386 20,754 1.51
Rhode Island 4,300 2,901 1.48
South Carolina
South Dakota 2,707 2,338 1.16
Tennessee 14,630 9,075 1.61
Texas 65,116 41,690 1.56
Utah 24,360 10,736 2.27
Vermont 3,263 1,928 1.69
Virginia 37,125 24,224 1.53
Washington 32,640 16,087 2.03
West Virginia 6,554 4,436 1.48
Wisconsin
Wyoming 6,538 4,734 1.38
